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Is technology-neutral legislation possible? Technological 
neutrality in legislation is often praised for its flexibility and ability 
to apply to future technologies. Yet, time and again we realize that 
even if the law did not name any technology, it was nevertheless 
based on an image of a particular technology. When new 
technologies appear, they expose the underlying technological 
mindset of the existing law. This article suggests that we read 
technology-related laws to uncover their hidden technological 
mindset so that we can better understand the law and prepare for 
the future. Reverse engineering the law is an interpretive mode, 
tailored to uncover the technological layer of the law. 
After locating the discussion within the emerging research 
paradigm of law and technology, the article unpacks the meaning 
of technology-neutral legislation and points to three possible 
justifications thereof: flexibility, innovation and harmonization. 
The article then suggests an initial typology of the range of 
legislative choices, one that is richer than a binary all-or-nothing 
choice. The typology is based on three continuums: means-end, 
promotion-restriction and abstract-concrete. The three continuums 
can assist policy makers in deciding whether to attempt legislating 
in a technologically neutral matter or not. The article then 
explains the methodology of reverse engineering the law. 
The next step is to challenge the claim of neutrality in the 
context of informational privacy. Proposals to amend the law are 
on the tables of policy-makers in the United States and in the 
European Union (EU). I focus on the current global engine of data 
protection law, the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive. The 
reverse engineering of the Directive indicates that it is more 
technology-neutral than we might have expected from an 
introduction  
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instrument that was composed in the early 1990s based on 
lawsffrom the early 1970s. Nevertheless, a close reading reveals 
the Directive’s underlying technological mindset and hidden 
assumptions. I conclude that pure technologically neutral 
legislation is, to a great extent, a myth. 
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This article explores a paradox about technology-related 
legislation. On the one hand, legislators often declare that their 
motivation in enacting a new law is driven by the implications of 
new technologies. Indeed, laws do not regulate technology tabula 
rasa. When the law enters a technological field, it necessarily 
carries with it an image of the technology it is about to address. 
This technological image might be explicit or hidden; it might be 
based on a factual inquiry or on a general perception; it might be 
accurate or misguided. The underlying image shapes the law’s 
mindset regarding its technological subject matter. 
On the other hand, a common claim about technology-
related laws is that they are technology-neutral; namely, that they 
can apply to all relevant technologies. Legislative technological 
neutrality is said to achieve several important goals, which I shall 
identify as flexibility, innovation, and harmonization. These three 
goals, if achieved, could assure that the law remains relevant even 
in light of newer technologies that were not anticipated at the time 
of legislation (flexibility); they promote the development of new 
and hopefully better technologies—or at least they do not hinder it 
(innovation); and they can smooth and streamline the diffusion of 
technologies (harmonization). Technological neutrality also 
attempts to overcome any technological bias that the law might 
have. In other words, technology-neutral laws purport to regulate 
technology without envisaging an image of the regulated 
technology. Hence the paradox: can the law regulate technology 
and yet remain blind as to the regulated technology? Is technology-
neutral legislation possible? 
This article suggests that we read technology-related laws 
so as to uncover their technological mindset. This is the reverse 
engineering of the law. Such a reading is an interpretive tool that 
can assist us in evaluating the law and the legal ramifications of 
new technologies. The proposed reading—the reverse engineering 
of the law—is different from a lawyer’s legal reading of the law, 
which aims to figure out the scope of a given law (“What is the 
law?”). It differs from an interpretative mode that searches for a 
law’s purpose (“What is the law meant to achieve?”). Nor is it a 
historical reading, aimed at figuring out the original intention of its 
legislators (“What did the legislators intend?”). Instead, the 
proposed reading is interested in the legislation’s attitude as to 
technology: “What is the law’s underlying technological mindset?” 
I seek the legislation’s meaning in its outcome, rather than in the 
intentions of the law’s drafters or the legislative history. This 
reading is informed by literary criticism in its focus on the text and  
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the subtext. Like other interpretive modes, it tries to expose hidden 
assumptions. 
One possible explanation of the paradox would be to deny 
the first claim, that the law has an underlying image about the 
regulated technology. However, this answer would be too cursory. 
Time and again we realize that a law that seemed to be technology-
neutral at one point (usually the time of its legislation), is in fact 
based on a particular technology, albeit in a general manner. We 
often realize the technological mindset that is embedded in the law 
only once a new technological paradigm replaces the previous one. 
This was true of copyright law when the digital environment 
challenged analogue works of authorship, it was true of various 
laws that require a particular form for contracts (such as “writing” 
or a “signature”) and it is true once again in the realm of privacy 
law. New technologies expose how the current law was shaped 
around a particular vision of technology, snapshotted in its past 
social context, even if a seemingly neutral language was applied. 
Accordingly, I suggest that we read the law as a socio-
cultural text that consists of several layers of meanings. 
Underneath the plain text and the legal rules, there are hidden 
layers, composed of the legislature’s assumptions as to society, 
culture, technology, and probably much more. Here, I focus on 
deciphering the technological layer by reverse engineering the law 
so as to expose its technological mindset. The case study applied 
here is informational privacy law - more specifically, the EU Data 
Protection Directive.1 
The law of informational privacy is about to change. There 
are continuous demands for a new approach to this legal field. The 
triggers are new technologies, globalization, new business models, 
and national security interests, each pulling in a different direction. 
My focus here is on the impact of new technologies. Following 
several high profile privacy events that were met with public 
dismay and popular resistance, there has been a bottom-up demand 
directed at politicians “to do something.” Some recent privacy 
events include the revelation that Google, in its Street View 
project, collected not only photographs of houses (and people and 
cars), but also data sent over open WiFi networks;2 the revelation 
that Apple’s iPhone and iPad stored the geographical position of  
                                                
1 Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) 
[hereinafter Council Directive 95/46]. 
2 Google admitted its mistake on its official blog. WiFi data collection: An 
update, GOOGLE BLOG (May 14, 2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/ 
2010/05/wifi-data-collection-update.html. 
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the devices in a hidden folder,3 and several events in which 
Facebook used its users’ personal data in ways that the latter 
disagreed with, at least once they learned about it.4 
The popular bottom-up demands join political factors that 
push towards new regulatory approaches to privacy. In the United 
States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published a 
Preliminary Staff Report in late 2010 and a final report in March 
2012 suggesting a normative framework for businesses regarding 
the commercial use of consumer data.5 In Europe, there are on-
going discussions about a substantial amendment to the legal 
framework of data protection—the European term for 
informational privacy. In early 2012, the European Commission 
published a proposal for a new legal regime in the form of a 
European Regulation.6 Elsewhere, governments and legislatures 
are busy examining similar issues. One interesting suggestion that 
has gained much interest and attention in professional circles is 
Privacy by Design (PbD), promoted by Ontario’s Information 
office 
                                                
3 The discovery was made by Alasdair Allan and Pete Warden at the Where 2.0 
Conference. Alasdair Allan & Pete Warden, Got an iPhone or 3G iPad? Apple 
is recording your moves, O’REILLY RADAR (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://radar.oreilly.com/2011/04/apple-location-tracking.html. 
4 See, e.g., the Beacon feature that Facebook launched in 2007; the friends of a 
Facebook user were informed of the user’s actions taken on affiliated websites. 
A lawsuit followed and was settled. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order Approving Settlement, Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 08-3845 RS 
(N.D. Cal. May 24, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/28530843/ 
Lane-v-Facebook-N-D-Cal-Order-Approving-Settlement. Another Facebook 
privacy event was the automatic tagging of user’s photos, without their prior 
consent. See Facebook ‘Face Recognition’ Feature Draws Privacy Scrutiny, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/technology/ 
09facebook.html. 
5 FTC STAFF REPORT, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE – A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS 
(2010); FTC REPORT, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE – RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012). 
The report suggests that (1) Companies should adopt a “privacy by design” 
approach; (2) Companies should provide simplified choices for businesses and 
consumers; and (3) Companies should make their data practices more 
transparent. The Final Report retained the general framework proposed by the 
Preliminary Report, but narrowed its scope and its demand for universal 
consumer choice and emphasized the need to regulate information brokers.  
6 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_ 
en.pdf [hereinafter Proposed GDP Regulation]. A Regulation is directly 
applicable within the 27 Member States that comprise the European Union. 
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Commissioner, Anne Cavoukian.7 The idea is simple, though not 
easy to apply: plan and design technology so it takes care of 
privacy concerns to begin with rather than try and fix them later, 
once it is difficult, expensive, and in many cases, too late.8 PbD 
tries to inject legal notions of privacy into the technology in an 
explicit manner: it is a legal attempt to shape technology. Here, I 
wish to explore the other direction: how the technology shaped the 
law. 
The article wishes to make three contributions, from the 
abstract to the concrete: first, to elaborate on our understanding of 
the relationship between law and technology; second, to suggest 
the interpretive methodology of reverse engineering the law; and 
third, to expose the hidden technological assumptions of 
informational privacy law. Once we realize what the current law’s 
technological assumptions are, we can better understand the law in 
a coherent way. This is an interpretive advantage. Moreover, once 
we uncover the law’s technological mindset, we are better 
equipped to address new technologies. We might not yet know 
how to regulate them, if at all, but at least we know the limits of 
our current legal scheme. This is a legislative advantage: reverse 
engineering the law can provide a better roadmap for prospective 
legislation.9 
Part I locates the project within the still relatively new 
academic paradigm of law and technology. I discuss the dialectical 
relationship between law and technology in which they converse 
and respond to each other, rather than engage in an outright battle 
or a disconnection. Part II turns to the other prong of the above 
mentioned paradox: technology-neutral legislation. It unpacks the 
much-asserted call for technology-neutral legislation rather than 
technology-specific legislation. I point to three main considerations 
that may justify the neutrality position: flexibility, innovation and 
harmonization. I then offer an initial typology of technology-
neutral 
                                                
7 See Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles, 
PRIVACY BY DESIGN, http://privacybydesign.ca (last visited Jan. 9, 2013). For an 
analysis, see Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1409 (2011). 
8 See, e.g., Ken Anderson & Michelle Chibba, Privacy by Design: Meeting the 
Privacy Challenge in a Changing World, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, 
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY (2011). 
9 The next step, not carried out here, would be to compare the exposed 
underlying technological assumptions of the law to the traits of emerging—and 
more so—future technologies. Such an analysis is conducted under the auspice 
of PRACTIS, a European research group, focusing on the privacy implications 
of future technologies. See Description of Work, PRACTIS - PRIVACY 
APPRAISING CHALLENGES TO TECHNOLOGIES AND ETHICS, www.practis.org (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2012). 
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neutral legislation and point out its limits. Part III introduces and 
explains the methodology of reverse engineering the law. Part IV 
turns to the case study discussed here and outlines the legal regime 
of informational privacy. I provide a condensed overview of the 
different legal approaches to privacy interests in personal data, 
especially the American sectoral approach and the European 
omnibus approach. Both legal regimes, to the extent that they 
address the matter, build substantially on the notion of Fair 
Information Principles (FIPs). The European Directive on Data 
Protection of 1995 (95/46/EC) has been the engine of this 
emerging global regime. Due to its global influence, it is today the 
most important data protection instrument and hence serves as the 
leading case study.10 
Part V turns to reading the European Directive so as to 
reverse engineer it. I focus on its key constructs. This reading 
indicates that data protection law as exemplified in the Directive is 
more technological-neutral than we might have expected from an 
instrument that was composed in the early 1990s based on laws 
from the early 1970s and guidelines from the early 1980s. 
Nevertheless, the close reading reveals some of its underlying 
technological mindset and assumptions. 
First, I will argue that current informational privacy law 
assumes a linear sequence as to personal data, in which the data is 
first collected and stored, then used in various ways and then 
transferred to another controller for further use. This linear view 
assumes that each segment can be placed under the responsibility 
of a relevant player. The linear view enables us to see that there are 
very few meeting points between the data subject (i.e., the 
individuals) and the data controller (i.e., the collector and 
processor of the data), which can serve as points of control where 
data subjects can exercise their rights. Second, the legal regime of 
data protection has a strong focus on the notion of a database. The 
idea that the data is stored in some giant database seems to have 
carried a great influence on the drafters of the Directive, or at least 
the outcome indicates so. 
At the end of the day, the answer to the paradox is that the 
law is less technologically neutral than we currently admit. 
Drafting legislation in a technology-neutral manner might be a 
worthy goal, but we should acknowledge that success in achieving 
                                                
10 See Michael D. Birnhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a 
Global Regime, 24 COMP. L. & SEC. REP. 508 (2008); Christopher Kuner, An 
International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and Prospects, 25 
COMP. L. & SEC. REP. 307 (2009). A few American scholars referred to the 
Directive as aggressive. I find it far less aggressive than these statements. See 
Birnhack, supra. 
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this goal can, at best, be partial. To a large extent, technology-
neutral legislation is a myth. 
I. FRAMEWORK: LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
This Part lays the theoretical framework for the reverse 
engineering of data protection law. I locate the issue of 
informational privacy within the broader discussion of the 
relationship between law and technology. 
The digital revolution created both new opportunities and 
new risks. The latter, more than the former, triggered the law. 
Time and again we realize that we need to quickly figure out 
whether old laws apply to the new environment and, if so, how. If 
the old laws do not fit the new situation, we have to decide whether 
to enact new laws. By now, these are familiar discussions: should 
we regulate online speech so as to protect our children from 
exposure to harmful content?11 What is the proper balance between 
copyright owners and users online?12 Are ISPs and other 
intermediaries liable for harmful acts done by end-users?13 Should 
anonymous users be unmasked?14 The list of questions is endless. 
Each deserved much attention by legislatures, courts, scholars and 
the public at large. The debates gave rise to a meta-discussion: Is 
technology regulable at all? Should the law do so? The scholarship 
about the relationship between the law and technology, especially 
information technology, covers these questions. 
I summarize this debate in broad-brush. My purpose is 
instrumental: to explore the more subtle interactions between law 
and technology. Once the legislature concludes that it has the 
power and that it is wise to intervene in some way to regulate the 
activity that takes place within a technological environment or 
perhaps even regulate technology directly, the legislators proceed 
with a certain perception of the regulated subject matter. This is 
what I call the technological mindset. 
 
                                                
11 See, e.g., Symposium, Do Children Have the Same First Amendment Rights as 
Adults? 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2004). 
12 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF 
THE MIND (2010). 
13 Compare 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (providing ISPs with broad immunity from 
liability for various users’ torts), with 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (providing ISPs 
with limited liability, based upon some conditions, from liability under 
copyright law). 
14 The law on this point is unsettled and different state courts in the United 
States articulated various legal tests on the matter. See, for example, Pilchesky 
v. Gatelli, 12 A.3d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011), and a discussion of the various 
tests in Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent 
Legal Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320 (2008). 
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 One view of the law and technology debate considers 
technology to be a unique phenomenon, which is by its nature 
unregulable. Call it a technology-separatist view. In its extreme 
version, the argument is that technology develops according to its 
own rules, in a separate world, apart from that of other social 
phenomena, especially the law. According to this view, the law 
cannot interfere with the course of technology, which is taken to be 
pre-determined. Any attempt to interfere is useless and a waste of 
time and effort on behalf of the lawyers. It could also be an 
unnecessary disruption that could damage the inevitable process, at 
least until technology defies the law. Kevin Kelly’s assertion of 
“what technology wants” reflects this approach. Kelly assumes that 
technology has an internal, independent drive.15 The deterministic 
view isolates technology from society and subjects the latter to the 
former.16 
Somewhat milder views argue that the law should not 
interfere in the development of the technology and leave it to its 
own devices. John Perry Barlow’s oft-quoted 1996 Declaration of 
Independence of Cyberspace urged the “Governments of the 
Industrial World,” the “weary giants of flesh and steel,” to “leave 
us alone.” Cyberspace, Barlow declared, “is an act of nature and it 
grows itself through our collective actions.”17 Barlow’s declaration 
was based, so it seems, on a libertarian set of values. Another 
famous argument, by David Johnson and David Post also in 1996, 
was that cyberspace requires a distinct legal system.18 Both these 
views do not exclude law entirely from the technological realm, 
but they do narrow the permitted intervention - to self-regulation in 
Barlow’s case and to a sui generis internet law, in the case of 
Johnson and Post. 
The other side of the debate challenges the basic 
assumptions of the deterministic view. Call it a socio-technological 
view. First, the socio-technological view emphasizes that 
technologies are not void of values. Each technology reflects a 
value or values (including conflicting values in some cases).19 The 
deterministic, technology-separatist view might agree with this 
idea, but it would argue that the values are given and fixed, as they 
                                                
15 KEVIN KELLY, WHAT TECHNOLOGY WANTS (2010). 
16 For a critique of technological determinism, see EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET 
DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM 289-95 (2011). 
17 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/ 
Declaration-Final.html. 
18 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
19 See, e.g., HUMAN VALUES AND THE DESIGN OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
(Batya Friedman ed., 1997); MOROZOV, supra note 16, at 295-99 (explaining 
why technology is never neutral.). 
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developed in the separate technological universe. With the 
separatist view, we are left, at most, with the choice of figuring out 
the embedded values and learning how to use such technologies. 
The socio-technological view, by contrast, is inclusive. It rejects 
the argument that the technology-embedded values are an 
unchangeable fact. Accordingly, we can actively design 
technologies to reflect values that we cherish. Moreover, 
technology and its embedded values are a social construct. Society, 
through various processes, decides what each technology means, 
how it is used, and ultimately, whether it is a “good” technology or 
a “bad” one. 
A second element of the socio-technological view, which 
stems directly from the previous one, is that as a matter of 
principle, technology is subject to the law just like any other 
human activity. The law provides a discursive platform to debate 
the issues and enable society to make decisions about values and 
technologies. According to this view in its extreme form, there is 
nothing particularly unique in technology, at least not in the basic 
question of its regulability.20 Under the socio-technological view, 
technology is a product of members of societies (individuals, 
corporations or governments) and there is no a-priori reason to 
exclude technology from the reach of the law. The question is no 
longer if it should be regulated, but rather how to regulate it. 
Between the two extreme ends of the deterministic, 
separatist view and the socio-technological view, there are many 
possible points. Technology reacts and interacts with the law in 
many ways. Sometimes law and technology join together to 
achieve a common goal. For example, Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (PETs) and privacy law both attempt to protect our 
privacy.21 Sometimes law and technology compete with one 
another and constantly try to outreach one another. The application 
of copyright law to file-sharing systems illustrates this point. The 
law imposed its rules on systems such as Napster, a move which 
was met by a counter-action: new peer-to-peer (p2p) systems were 
designed which were less regulable.22 Examples were Aimster 
(which encrypted users’ file exchange) and Grokster (which 
purported to be a distributed network but in fact induced users to 
                                                
20 Indeed, as a matter of fact, governments around the world do regulate 
information technology, cyberspace included, or at least they try to do so. 
Johnson and Post’s argument was thought-provoking at the time and drew the 
attention to many of these issues, but their suggestion has not yet materialized. 
21 On PETs, see Herbert Burkert, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, 
Critique, Vision¸ in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 125 
(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 2001).  
22 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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 exc 
exchange copyrighted files).23 The law responded once again, 
finding Aimster and Grokster to contribute to and induce copyright 
infringement, respectively.24 Technology responded once again, 
with truly distributed systems.25 The cat and mouse match is not 
over and probably will not be over in the near future.26 
The possibility of regulating technology does not mean that 
we must take this course. When the choice to regulate technology 
is made, there is a rich arsenal of legal tools to do so: local 
regulation and international instruments, criminal and civil laws, 
providing positive and negative incentives, addressing one link in a 
chain of activity so as to curtail it,27 and other legal tools. 
Subjecting technology to regulation does not mean being 
dogmatic. Before deciding if and how to regulate, legislators 
should carefully study the technology and understand its embedded 
values. On the legal side, we need to be clear as to what our goals 
are in the specific context: which norms does the law strive to 
achieve? If there are conflicting interests, how should we prioritize 
or balance them? After figuring these substantive issues, we need 
to get into the details and choose the best legislative mechanism 
and technique. Importantly, this might also mean that in certain 
cases, we should refrain from regulating at all. This article 
proceeds within the socio-technological approach. It is located 
within a paradigm that views technology as a product of social 
activity, which has social implications rather than an isolated, 
external and untouchable entity. 
II. LEGISLATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 
Once we acknowledge the complex, multi-faceted, and 
dialectical relationship between law and technology, we can look 
                                                
23 See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003); 
MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  
24 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d at 646; Grokster, 545 U.S. 913. 
25 The copyright owners in the music industry turned to prosecute the individual 
users in a series of multi-defendant litigation. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). 
26 For the subsequent round, see Eldar Haber, The French Revolution 2.0: 
Copyright and the Three Strikes Policy, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297 
(2011) (discussing the industry-driven initiatives to disconnect allegedly repeat 
infringers from the Internet altogether). Further rounds were the successful 
public battle over the Stop Online Privacy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. 
(2011) and Protect IP Act (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011), and on the 
international level, the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA).  
27 For addressing various links in the chain of a regulated activity, see Michael 
D. Birnhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom, Shielding Children: The European Way, 
79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 175 (2004) (comparing European attempts to regulate 
online content which is deemed harmful to minors to American attempts).  
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closer at some of these nuances. One of the important yet often 
overlooked aspects is that of legislative technique: how to translate 
the goals and means into the law itself. A recurrent position 
advocates that the law is drafted in a technologically-neutral 
manner. This Part challenges this idea and questions its very 
possibility. 
Section A sets the question; Section B provides an 
overview of the main considerations for and against the two 
possible legislative techniques: technological-neutral and 
technological-specific legislation; and Section C offers a brief 
typology of technology-neutral legislation along several 
parameters, suggesting that we replace a dichotomous approach 
with a series of continuums that form a complex legislative matrix. 
Finally, Section D provides an interim summary. 
A. Technology-Neutral Legislation 
Statements about the desirability of technology-neutral 
legislation abound.28 The idea is simple: the law should not name, 
specify or describe a particular technology, but rather speak in 
broader terms that can encompass more than one technology and, 
hopefully, would cover future technologies that are not yet known t 
                                                
28 For an example in copyright law, see the report of the Committee on 
Commerce, H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), at 25 (1998), on the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998: “The Committee thus seeks to protect the interests of 
copyright owners in the digital environment, while ensuring that copyright law 
remain technology neutral”; and the discussion in Daniel Gervais, The Tangled 
Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 857 (2009). 
In patent law see, for example, Ben McEniery, Physicality and the 
Information Age: A Normative Perspective on the Patent Eligibility of Non-
Physical Methods, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 106, 109 (2010), arguing that 
“a technology-neutral subject matter test is the appropriate standard in an age 
where new advances in information technology and information management 
are likely to become increasingly important in the economy in the 21st century.” 
In the context of electronic signatures, see, for example, Anjanette 
Raymond, Improving Confidence in Cross Border Electronic Commerce: 
Communication, Signature, and Authentication Devices, 14(11) J. INTERNET L. 
25, 33 (2011): “At the cross border level the law must begin to be harmonized, 
which can only occur if the majority of domestic systems recognize the need for 
technology neutral drafting techniques.” 
In telecommunication law, see, for example, Ellen P. Goodman & 
Anne H. Chen, Digital Public Service Media Networks to Advance Broadband 
and Enrich Connected Communities, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 81, 119 
(2011), advocating a new Public Service Media which maintains a technology-
neutral position.  
In environmental law, see for example, David E. Adelman & John H. 
Barton, Environmental Regulation for Agriculture: Towards a Framework to 
Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN. ENVT’L. L.J. 3, 40 (2002), 
proposing technology-neutral regulations of agricultural inputs and emissions.  
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at the time of legislation. The guidance that the law should be 
neutral in this sense is a much heralded and cherished principle, 
though it is not always followed. Those who argue that technology-
specific legislation is preferable often find themselves arguing 
against the stream.29 Naturally, we find statements about the 
importance of the technology-neutral stance mostly in fields that 
have direct encounters with technology, such as intellectual 
property,30 e-commerce,31 telecommunications,32 environmental 
law,33 and, in recent years, privacy law.34 However, a closer 
examination of these laws and their reference to technology 
indicates that their claims or aspirations for technology neutrality 
mean quite a few different things. Accordingly, we should unpack 
the concept of technology neutrality. 
The choice between technology-neutral or technology-
specific legislation has a familiar jurisprudential parallel, the 
distinction between standards and rules. The latter discussion is 
relevant for the law in general. H.L.A. Hart offered a now-classic 
jurisprudential example: a legal rule that prohibits vehicles in a 
park.35 It seems to be a straightforward rule with a clear core, but it 
has an unclear penumbra. While Hart used the example to argue 
that the law is not as indeterminate as the legal realists have 
                                                
29 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Argument Against Technology-Neutral Surveillance 
Laws, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1685 (2010) (favoring technology-specific legislation in 
surveillance law); Laura Hildner, Note, Defusing the Threat of RFID: Protecting 
Consumer Privacy through Technology-Specific Legislation at the State Level, 
41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 138 (2006) (arguing that “RFID technology 
poses a distinct and significant threat to consumer privacy even in a society 
where private entities routinely intrude upon individuals” and hence advocates 
technology-specific state legislation in addition to “baseline privacy 
legislation”). 
30 See Gervais, supra note 28. 
31 See, e.g., Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater 
Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1359 (2001) 
(listing technology neutrality as one of four policy considerations in developing 
a test for internet jurisdiction and supporting neutrality due to its ability to 
withstand technological changes); Raymond, supra note 28 (discussing 
neutrality regarding electronic signatures). 
32 See Goodman & Chen, Digital Public Service, supra note 28; Ellen P. 
Goodman & Anne H. Chen, Modeling Policy for New Public Service Media 
Networks, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 123 n. 52 (2010) (noting the White 
House and the FCC’s technological neutrality policy regarding the 
electromagnetic spectrum). 
33 See, e.g., Adelman & Barton, supra note 28. 
34 See infra Part VI. 
35 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125-26 (2d ed. 1994). Hart’s 
example, first articulated in 1961, is still subject to debate. See, e.g., Frederick 
Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109 
(2008).  
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argued, the example illustrates that rules do have such an inherent 
indeterminate element. Importantly, technology plays a critical role  
in rendering the rule indeterminate. The advancement of new 
technologies enables us to add more examples to the no-vehicle-in-
the-park prohibition: is an electric wheelchair a “vehicle?” What 
about a Segway? The debate that Hart referred to and that his 
example further provoked was mostly about interpretation. The 
debate discussed here, about technology-neutral/technology-
specific legislation can be restated in these terms: technology-
neutral laws are equivalent to standards and the technology-
specific laws are equivalent to rules. The technological context 
draws our attention from the act of interpretation to the act of 
legislation. 
B.  Considerations and Justifications 
Why does the legislative technique matter? Several 
considerations are relevant when assessing legislation and 
choosing either a technology-neutral approach or a technology-
specific one. If the considerations apply, they become justifications 
for the chosen technique. I discuss three main considerations that 
favor the former and the responses on behalf of the latter: 
flexibility, innovation and harmonization.36 
1. Flexibility 
First and foremost, a technology-neutral legislative 
technique is flexible, in that it can cover a wide range of 
technologies. Given that the law cannot anticipate new 
                                                
36 Cf. Ohm, supra note 29. In the context of surveillance law, Ohm classified the 
considerations under different titles: (1) consistency, by which he means “the 
need to avoid arbitrary distinctions between technologies that should be treated 
alike.” (Id. at 1691-92); (2) keeping up with technological change (Id. at 1692-
94), pointing out that technology-specific laws tend to become under-inclusive 
over time; this argument is roughly equivalent to the flexibility consideration I 
discuss here; and (3) institutional competence (Id. at 1694), by which he refers 
to the relationship between the executive branch and the legislature and does not 
address the judiciary. Ohm then criticizes each of these arguments and 
concludes supporting technology-specific legislation for surveillance law.  
Bert-Jaap Koops pointed to four legislative purposes in opting for 
technological neutrality: (1) achieving specific results; (2) functional 
equivalence between different modes of activity; (3) non-discrimination between 
technologies that have the same effects; and (4) allowing for future 
technological developments, which is what I call here flexibility. Bert-Jaap 
Koops, Should ICT Regulation be Technology-Neutral, in STARTING POINTS FOR 
ICT REGULATION: DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS 77 (Bert-
Jaap Koops et al. eds., 2006). See also Chris Reed, Taking Sides on Technology 
Neutrality, 4(3) SCRIPTED 263, 268 (2007).  
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 technologies 
technologies in detail, and once we acknowledge that technology 
does develop and change faster than the pace of the legislative 
process, the preference for a law that will last for longer than the 
present moment is clear. Bert-Jaap Koops called this the 
“futureproofing” of the law.37 A law that mentions a specific 
technology is bound to become obsolete sooner rather than later, 
whereas a law that does not name a particular technology might be 
able to apply to the next innovation. Instead of naming 
technologies, technology-neutral legislation focuses on its 
functions or on the related human behavior. Such legislative 
flexibility also answers the argument often raised by the 
technology-separatist view discussed supra, which is that the law 
itself is obsolete and that its attempts to regulate technology are 
doomed to fail. 
Legislators of a flexible, technology-neutral law rely on 
others to interpret the law and apply it to particular concrete 
circumstances. Regulators in the executive branch often apply the 
law to specific cases, as do courts. It is a regular judicial task to 
interpret a law and apply it to new technologies that emerged after 
the law was enacted. 
Surveillance law provides an example of the needed 
legislative flexibility and the courts’ ability to apply general, 
technology-neutral laws to concrete technologies.38 Orin Kerr 
suggested that the technology-neutral Fourth Amendment should 
be transposed to the Internet.39 His suggestion leaves the law 
technologically neutral and asks the courts to conduct the 
application in a technology-neutral manner as well.40 Other than 
the Fourth Amendment itself, current American surveillance 
legislation is technology-specific: each law is based on a specific 
kind of technology—postal mail, telephone, e-mail, etc.41 Thus, 
courts need to interpret each factual situation to fit it to the relevant 
                                                
37 Koops, supra note 36. 
38 But cf. Ohm, supra note 29 (arguing in favor of technology-specific 
surveillance laws). 
39 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010). Kerr discusses the inside/outside 
distinction regarding a physical setting under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
and suggests that courts roughly replicate it in the digital environment. The 
equivalent he suggests is content/non-content regarding communications 
networks. 
40 Id. 
41 See Robert A. Pikowsky, An Argument for a Technology-Neutral Statute 
Governing Wiretapping and Interception of E-Mail, 47 THE ADVOCATE 23 
(2004) (advocating a unified level of protection of communications, regardless 
of the technology). 
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statute.42 For example, before the enactment of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), courts struggled to 
place mobile (not yet cellular) cordless phones within the 
legislative scheme.43 
In privacy law, the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 
(VPPA) applies to “video tape service provider[s].”44 While the 
term “video tape” is left undefined, the definition of the service 
provider is a bit broader and covers “prerecorded video cassette 
tapes or similar audio visual material.”45 Paul Schwartz considers 
this definition to be a technology-neutral one, which easily covers 
DVDs,46 yet he admits that technological convergence raises new 
challenges, and that there are open questions if the VPPA is to 
apply to digital media.47 The legislative text addresses content 
which is fixed in a tangible medium, to borrow a term from 
copyright law, but it also adds “similar audio visual material.” It 
took a court decision to conclude that online video content falls 
within the VPPA’s definitions.48 The district court explained that 
the VPPA is about the video content, not the method of delivery of 
the content.49 The court then concluded that “Congress used 
‘similar audio video materials’ to ensure that VPPA’s protections 
would retain their force even as technologies evolve.”50 In other 
words, the court read the statute as technologically neutral. 
These examples of surveillance law and the VPPA 
demonstrate how the law can be technology-neutral on one level 
but at the same time technology-specific in practice. Moreover, the 
examples illustrate that courts can stretch old technological 
definitions to apply to newer technologies, but only to some extent. 
                                                
42 If the technology-specific laws do not cover all situations, courts might 
struggle first to find the appropriate statute and then apply it to the concrete 
situation. This is for example the current state of surveillance law in Israel. 
Courts struggle with classifying email communication into the Secret 
Monitoring Act of 1979 and ask questions such as: “When was the conversation 
completed? If it was intercepted before the recipient opened the email box, is it 
subject to regular search and seizure rules or to the Secret Monitoring Act?” See, 
e.g., CrimA 040206/05 State of Israel v. Philosoph [2007] (Isr.) (unpublished 
opinion) (on file with the author).  
43 See Pikowsky, supra note 41, at 25. 
44 Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). Congress enacted yet 
another law referring to personally identifying information collected by a cable 
operator with respect to the subscriber. See Cable TV Privacy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 
551 (2006). 
45 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4). 
46 Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 912 (2009). 
47 Id. at 923. 
48 See In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. 11-03764, 2012 WL 3282960 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 10, 2012). 
49 Id. at *5. 
50 Id. at *6.  
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 In the context of patent law, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley 
pointed to the legislative neutrality of the law, but argued that “[a]s 
a practical matter, it appears that while patent law is technology-
neutral in theory, it is technology-specific in application.”51 The 
technological neutrality of patent law enabled it to remain relevant 
for over two centuries since the ratification of the Constitution 
granted Congress the power to enact such laws,52 and despite 
technological advancements and the shift from mechanical 
inventions to electronics, computing, telecommunications, and 
biotechnology.53 More specifically, Burk and Lemley pointed to 
the patent law doctrine of the “person having ordinary skill in the 
art” as the legal place that enables the general technology-neutral 
law to be applied in a specific manner.54 Still in patent law, 
Michael Meurer focused on the utility requirement and argued that 
although it is phrased in a technology-neutral language, it is 
relevant only for biotechnological inventions.55 However, the 
utility requirement does not impede any other inventions on their 
way to be protected by a patent.56 
The cases taken together indicate that one prevalent 
legislative technique is to have a division of labor between the 
legislature and the judiciary, utilizing the technology-neutral 
stance. Opting for a technology-neutral legislative technique shifts 
some power from the legislature to the courts. There is also an 
important difference in the timeline: the general, technology-
neutral law is an ex ante regulation, while the specification and 
application of the general instruction to the facts of the case is 
conducted ex post, on a case-by-case basis. 
The flipside of flexibility does not only opt for present and 
specific technologies, but also certainty. A technology-specific 
legislation is almost by definition more accurate and specially 
tailored to the problem that the legislation aims to solve. It can pin-
point the issues at stake in a particular context.57 A technology- 
                                                
51 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002). But, at least regarding the one patent 
law doctrine, there is an argument that the law is applied in a neutral way. See 
Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine 
Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379, 1419 (2010) (arguing that courts formulated the 
printed matter doctrine in a technology-neutral way).  
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
53 Burk & Lemley, supra note 51, at 1159.  
54 Burk & Lemley, supra note 51, at 1185-90. 
55 Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
675 (2009). 
56 Id. at 706 (“On its face, the utility standard is technology neutral, but in 
practice the utility standard is usually an issue for only chemical inventions.”). 
57 See the following arguments in favor of technology-specific laws, which turn 
to the need for nuanced, tailor-made laws. In the context of surveillance law, 
Ohm, supra note 29, at 1695-96, argues that some technological differences do 
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specific legislation is less flexible, but on occasion we do prefer 
accurate, narrowly-tailored regulations. For example, when the law 
is restrictive and might have adverse consequences, a specific 
legislation is preferable. This is the case with law that might have a 
chilling effect on innovation (an issue discussed below) or on 
speech. It might also be the case that the legislature prefers a 
cautious, step-by-step approach instead of attempting to instate a 
more general approach. Caution is advisable when the 
technological path is particularly ambiguous, mysterious, and 
unexpected, such as in the case of nanotechnology, at least at this 
point in its research.58 
Those who, for constitutional reasons, prefer that law-
making remains the task of the legislature rather than the judiciary 
also tend to favor technology-specific legislation that gives the 
judiciary a narrower role. Paul Ohm lists a related constitutional 
consideration in favor of technology-specific legislation: 
technology-specific laws limit the executive branch’s power so that 
if new technologies require rethinking the law, it will be Congress 
that will examine the matter, in an open, transparent, participatory 
way, rather than the executive branch.59 
2.  Innovation 
The legislative technique regarding technology interacts 
with an important consideration in technology policy: innovation. 
The baseline is that society is interested in promoting innovation. 
Innovation is a complex notion,60which requires separate 
treatment; here I will assume that it is a public interest. 
Technology- 
                                                                                                         
deserve different treatment. In the context of nanotechnology, Susan Brenner 
argues for a technology-specific regulation “given the apparently unique aspects 
of the technology at issue,” but she also raises some doubts, as she assumes that 
a specific law would result in a specialized regulator even though it is too early 
to assess whether the technology would be a transformative one. See Susan W. 
Brenner, Nanocrime?, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 39, 56 (2011). In the 
context of RFID, Hildner, supra note 29, at 163-65, argues that technology-
specific laws are justified on the grounds that “[t]echnology-specific legislation 
allows for collection limitation provisions particular to RFID, which makes it 
more rigid than baseline privacy legislation but also more nuanced,” and that it 
is tailored. Hildner assumes that the general privacy legislation lacks such a 
collection limitation principle, which need not necessarily be the case. However, 
the EU does have such a principle. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, 
art. 6(1)(b).  
58 See Brenner, supra note 57, at 56-57. 
59 See Ohm, supra note 29, at 1686, 1700. 
60 See Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257 
(2010) (arguing that the innovation discourse draws our attention to the 
beginning of the life cycle of a technology and away from its diffusion). 
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Technology-specific legislation might hinder innovation in at least 
three ways. 
First, if the law chooses one technology, the incentive to 
develop other technologies that achieve the same function might 
decrease. For example, in the context of electronic signatures, had 
the law chosen a particular technology as the only legal way to 
validate the e-signature, there would be less incentive for 
competitors to develop another technology that might be 
superior.61 A technology-neutral choice, on the other hand, 
encourages competition among developers and among 
technologies. It creates a breathing space for innovation.62 If we 
end up with several technologies, we might need to solve the 
question of interoperability, but so far the market has proved that it 
can handle this, on occasion with legal support in the form of 
antitrust law.63 
Second, a legislative endorsement of one particular 
technology might cause a technological lock-in: the chosen 
technology will be used even if there are superior technologies. 
Once a technology is implemented and widely used, there are costs 
of switching to other technologies (e.g., costs of removing the old 
technology, installing the new one, learning to use the new one, 
converting old outputs to the new technology). If the switching 
costs are higher than the perceived benefit, a technological lock-in 
would occur, even though the locked-in technology is inferior to 
newer ones.64 A technology-neutral law reduces the chances of a 
                                                
61 For a similar argument in the context of environmental law, see Nicholas G. 
Morrow, Note, Federal Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions a Practical 
Certainty: How Will the Texas Energy Industry Survive--Maybe Thrive?, 17 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 237, 254-55 (2011), observing that a bill discussed 
there is not technology-neutral and adding that “many feel that because the Bill 
is not technology neutral, it steers energy companies away from developing 
renewable energy sources.” 
62 “Breathing space? is a term borrowed from First Amendment jurisprudence, 
though it plays differently in each context. In the First Amendment context, 
breathing space is asserted in order to require a narrow legislation (or none at 
all), whereas in the context of innovation, breathing space requires flexible, 
broad legislation (or none at all). See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 
(1963) (“Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, 
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”). 
63 In the famous Microsoft antitrust case, the company, which had a monopoly in 
one market (PC operating systems), tied to it a separate product (the Internet 
Explorer browser). One element of the decree against Microsoft was that it 
should disclose some proprietary information so as to enable third party 
developers to access it, in order to achieve interoperability. Mass. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1216-22 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
64 The classic example is the arrangement of the keyboard in the QWERTY 
format, which was a result of a technological need of mechanical typewriters, 
but was carried on to electronic keyboards even though the mechanical problem 
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technological lock-in, although the market still might lead to such 
an unfortunate result. Once again, the technology-neutral 
legislative choice enables a breathing space for technological 
innovation. An innovation policy that relies inter alia on 
competition would like to avoid lock-ins of this kind. A 
technology-specific law encourages such lock-ins. While a neutral 
position might not necessarily avoid lock-ins, it at least does not 
support it. 
Third, a technology-specific rule might provide incentives 
to work around the regulation. This might happen when the 
regulation imposes duties or legal liability on a party that operates 
or uses a specific technology. The savvy business or engineer will 
design the technology so to avoid the law’s definition of the 
particular technology, thus avoiding the liability. 
Technology-neutral legislation enables a breathing space 
for innovation and avoids the problem of being worked-around. On 
the other hand, the open-ended nature of a technology-neutral 
legislation might have a chilling effect on developers of 
technology. Not knowing in advance how the law might address 
their technology, they might refrain from pursuing it, perhaps to 
the detriment of all. Details and specification can provide certainty. 
Whether there is such a chilling effect requires empirical research; 
it would also depend on the attitude the law takes regarding the 
technology, namely whether it is permissive or restrictive. 
3. Harmonization 
A third consideration that supports technology-neutral 
legislation is that it is likely to achieve harmonization among 
different jurisdictions. This consideration applies when the 
technology or its use is not limited to a defined locality and where 
various jurisdictions address the same issue more or less 
simultaneously. Thus, this consideration is obviously relevant for 
the online digital environment. In this sense, the legal network 
converges with the network dimension, which characterizes many 
technologies. In the United States, harmonization is a relevant 
consideration when addressing laws that have or might have an 
interstate effect or when contemplating interstate federal 
legislation. In the European Union, it is relevant to achieve 
harmonization of the internal economic market. 
The case of electronic signature, mentioned above, 
illustrates this point. Online transactions often take place across 
borders. Had each state chosen a particular technology and enacted  
                                                                                                         
was no longer relevant. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of 
QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985). 
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it into its legislation in a technology-specific manner, then, 
inasmuch as electronic signatures are important to facilitate online 
commerce, there would likely be an impediment to interstate and 
international e-commerce.65 A technology-neutral legislation 
would validate many technologies, not based on their specificities 
but on their function, and thus enable harmonization.66 The 
downside of opting for a broader statutory language is that the use 
of many different technologies might lead to lack of 
interoperability. 
Thus, the greater the importance we attach to 
harmonization, the more general the law would be, namely, opting 
for less specificity and more neutrality. 
C.  An Initial Typology 
The considerations discussed above might justify a 
technology-neutral legislative technique, but this is only the first of 
a series of decisions to make. The choice of a legislative technique 
is not necessarily crude, between a technology-neutral position and 
a technology-specific one. We should take into account a broader 
range of parameters, resulting in a richer matrix of legislative 
choices. The dichotomy is thus replaced with several continuums 
that can help us nuance the legislative decision. First, what does 
the law regulate? What is the place of the technology in the 
specific legislation? Is the technology the law’s subject matter or is 
the technology just a tool? Second, how does the law treat 
technology? Does the law actively promote, passively permit or 
directly restrict it? Third, how does the law define the regulated 
technology? What is the level of abstraction in which the 
legislation treats the technology? Fourth, who regulates 
technology? What body assumes the task? We can then examine if 
and how the considerations of flexibility, innovation and 
harmonization intertwine with the suggested continuums. 
1. What does the law regulate? Ends—Means 
In some cases, technology is at the center of legislation. It 
is its subject matter. This is the case, for example, with intellectual 
property law. In other cases, the subject matter of the legislation is 
not the technology per-se, but a different subject, such as 
                                                
65 Indeed, early state laws on electronic signatures were technology-specific, but 
these were preempted by a federal law in 2000. See Allison W. Freedman, Note, 
The Electronic Signatures Act: Preempting State Law by Legislating 
Contradictory Technology Standards, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 807. 
66 See Raymond, supra note 28, at 29. 
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preventing copyright infringement, facilitating e-commerce or 
assuring children’s privacy. When technology is an inevitable part 
of the legal field it might be treated directly or indirectly as a 
means to achieve such ends. Below are some examples. 
Patent law places technology at center-stage. It is meant to 
“promote the progress of science and useful arts,”67 and regulates 
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.”68 Patent law is about encouraging new 
inventions in all technological fields. We might debate what a 
technology means in this context— for example, we might wonder 
whether a method of doing business qualifies as an invention.69 
Ultimately, once we agree on what qualifies as a technological 
field, patent law is geared towards technology. Technology is the 
law’s end. The forward-looking approach, actively encouraging 
technological innovation, demands a technology-neutral approach. 
The general and neutral law becomes concrete and technology-
specific when the Patent Office examines applications or when 
courts apply the law.70 If the government is interested in a 
particular technology it can always offer other incentives, such as 
procurement, direct investment, subsidies, or tax deductions. 
Copyright law also focuses on technology, but with less 
intensity than its sister field of patent law. Copyright law is said to 
encourage originality (and arguably, also creativity) in arts and 
literature.71 Once we accept the basic principle of copyright law, 
that it protects original expressions rather than ideas,72 we realize 
that expressions come in various shapes and sizes, according to the 
technology used. It can be written text, photograph, sculpture, 
broadcast, television or film, digital content, and much more.73 In 
fact 
                                                
67 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
68 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
69 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (holding that methods of doing 
business are not categorically outside the scope of patent law). 
70 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 51, at 1156. 
71 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that originality is the sine qua non of 
copyright law). 
72 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
73 In this sense, contemporary copyright law is technology-neutral in that it is 
not limited to a specific medium or technology. Yet, American copyright law 
does require that the original expression is “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression now known or later developed.” Id. Despite its future-welcoming 
approach, the fixation requirement could be seen as a technological limitation, 
as temporary copies are not fixed in a tangible medium, nor are oral lectures, 
unless they are based on a written text or recorded in some way. For a discussion 
of the judicial treatment of the fixation requirement regarding RAM temporary 
copies, see Melissa A. Bogden, Fixing Fixation: The RAM Copy Doctrine, 43 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181 (2011). 
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fact, the history of copyright law indicates that it advanced step by 
step, following new technologies.74 
Mapped onto the three considerations mentioned above, 
patent law and copyright law are, firstly, interested in maintaining 
flexibility as to the forms of inventions and creative works, in 
order to achieve innovation (patent law) and creativity (copyright 
law). Secondly, the neutrality enables a breathing space for 
innovation and creativity. Thirdly, a technology-specific law 
would cause difficulties in the international market, as different 
countries would end up protecting different kinds of inventions and 
works; hence the consideration of harmonization also pulls towards 
a technology-neutral stance.  
On the users’ side, we do see that the neutrality is 
sometimes compromised: in jurisdictions such as the EU that opted 
for an enumerated list of exceptions, subject to a general “three 
step test,” some of the exceptions are technology-specific.75 
However, in jurisdictions that opted for an open-ended, standard-
form fair use defense (e.g., the United States, Israel and the 
Philippines), copyright law is technology-neutral.76  
When we turn to e-commerce law, the subject matter and 
goal of the legislation is to facilitate and promote various forms of 
commercial interactions. Technology enables and forms the 
environment where such interactions take place, but from a 
legislative point of view, technology serves as a means rather than 
an end in itself. A leading example is the electronic signature 
mentioned supra; e-signatures play an important role in facilitating 
and streamlining transactions as they enable the parties to 
authenticate the identity of their counter-parties. A law governing 
the signature adopts the e-signature itself as its subject matter. 
However, underlying the law is the functional role of the signature: 
e-signatures are regulated because of their role in facilitating e-
commerce, not because e-signatures have some inherent social 
value. The function (facilitating e-commerce) is more important 
than the technology’s essence. All three considerations—
                                                
74 See, e.g., STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY 
AND WHAT WE OWN 26 (2011) (discussing the growth of copyright law along 
new forms of expression). 
75 See Guido Westkamp, The ‘Three-Step Test’ and Copyright Limitations in 
Europe: European Copyright Law Between Approximation and National 
Decision Making, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 20 (2008) (“The 
permissible limitations are partially formulated in a technology-neutral manner 
and partially dependent on the [sic] whether the resulting copy is ‘digital.’”). 
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Copyright Act of 2007, 5768-2007, 2007 LSI 38, 
§ 19 (Isr.); Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 8293, § 
185 (June 6, 1997) (Phil.).  
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flexibility, innovation and harmonization—demand a technology-
neutral law.77  
A caveat is in place: the line between presenting a law’s 
treatment of technology as an end or as a means is not a firm one, 
but neither is such a description natural or inevitable. We can 
describe patent law as promoting human flourishing and thus treat 
technology as a means to achieve it. We can describe copyright 
law as an “engine of free expression”78 and thus relegate 
technology to a secondary role. We can describe e-commerce 
legislation as an attempt to regulate technology directly. Indeed, 
the above presentation of the role of technology is not the only one 
possible. It is important, however, that legislatures and 
policymakers recognize that there are various roles to which they 
can designate technology in each context. Once they do so, they 
can evaluate the considerations for or against a technology-neutral 
approach and make an informed decision. It is a legislative choice. 
2. How does the law treat technology?      
Promotion—Restriction 
The law can promote a technology, permit it, be indifferent 
to it, discourage it, or even restrict it. Thus, there is a spectrum of 
attitudes that the law can take regarding a technology. We can 
place various laws on this spectrum. 
Patent law is a case of the law promoting technology. In its 
legal sister, copyright law, the picture is more complex. Copyright 
law’s anti-circumvention rules prohibit the manufacturing of a 
technology that is primarily designed for the purpose of 
circumventing a technological measure that controls access to a 
copyrighted work.79 In plain language: the law prohibits breaking a 
technology that protects a copyrighted work, such as a password-
protected digital music file. There are two technologies here: one is 
the technology that protects the copyrighted work (the 
“technological measure”); the other is the circumventing 
technology. The law’s attitude to the former is at least passive-
permissive, as it allows its use but does not require it, though we 
can go further and say that by protecting it, the law promotes the 
use of such technologies. As for circumventing technology, the law 
takes a prohibitive stance. Note that both kinds of technologies are 
described in a neutral language, based on their functions, rather 
than naming any particular technology or kind of technology. 
                                                
77 Raymond, supra note 28, at 33.  
78 I borrow the term from Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
79 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
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 We could examine additional laws and classify their 
treatment of technology on this spectrum. For our purposes here, 
what matters is the interaction of the axis of promotion—
restriction with the consideration of innovation mentioned above. 
Legislatures may choose rules that reach all technologies or few. 
Technologies promoted will evolve and spread; technologies 
restricted will lag. If the legislature is interested in promoting 
technology at large (as in patent law), a technology-neutral 
language allows maximum leeway for innovation. On the other 
hand, if the law restricts or prohibits a technology — a rare 
situation but one that does exist (regarding the production of 
weapons, drugs, malware or copyright anti-circumvention 
technologies, for example), then neutral language will lack 
certainty and might have a chilling effect on other technologies. In 
the case of a prohibition against weapons of mass destruction, 
perhaps such a chilling effect is a good idea, but in the case of 
copyright law, a broad prohibition of anti-circumvention 
technologies might deter the development of new technologies 
which have, as is often the case, a dual use: one that is innovative, 
creative and legal, and another that circumvents the protective 
technological measures and facilitates infringement.80 On the other 
hand, a narrow, technology-specific law will be quite useless, as it 
will be easy to design a new technology around the statutory 
limitations.81 
Once again, the legislature has a choice and it should be 
informed, inter alia, by the relevance of the three considerations of 
flexibility, innovation and harmonization, and their interplay with 
each possible point on the legislative yardstick. 
3. How does the law define the regulated 
technology? Abstract—Concrete 
A law can define the technology at stake in several levels 
of abstraction. Thus, as in the previous parameters, the choice 
between a technology-neutral and a technology-specific legislation 
is not a binary dichotomy, but a continuum. We can assume, for 
the sake of illustration, a law that permits the use of a particular 
version of particular software for a certain purpose. Such a detailed 
instruction might appear in a technical guide, but it is unlikely to 
                                                
80 The anti-circumvention rules, added to the Copyright Act by the DMCA in 
1998, were criticized inter alia for their limitation of innovation. See Niva 
Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers 
for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 72 (2005). 
81 It is not only “pirates” that carefully work around specific rules. Law 
enforcement might use new technologies that do not trigger technology-specific 
privacy protections. For this argument, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO 
HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 170-71 (2011). 
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appear in legislation. At the other end, patent law treats technology 
in the broadest possible manner (or so it seems at first sight).82 In 
between these ends, there are numerous levels of abstraction. 
Consider again copyright law’s anti-circumvention rule. Both 
technologies mentioned there (the copyright protective 
technological measure and the circumventing technology) are not 
specified in detail; rather, they are described according to their 
function (protect a copyrighted work; circumvent a technological 
measure). Legislatures can choose the level of abstraction.  
American free speech jurisprudence provides a useful 
terminology that we can borrow in order to better understand the 
legislative options. Courts subject limitations of speech to different 
degrees of scrutiny. The key is whether the limitation (a statute, 
executive decision, etc.) is content-based or content-neutral. If it is 
the former, the limitation would be reviewed under strict scrutiny, 
meaning that it is presumptively unconstitutional, unless the 
government shows otherwise.83 Content-neutral regulation is 
subject to an easier, intermediate scrutiny and is more likely to 
survive.84 Courts developed a further distinction within the 
content-based category, asking whether the limitation of free 
speech is viewpoint-based or viewpoint-neutral.85 
Borrowing this terminology, a better description of 
copyright law’s anti-circumvention rules is that they are the 
equivalent of a “content-based but viewpoint neutral,” category, as 
the law defines them according to a particular function but does 
not dictate a particular technology.86 This analogy to free speech 
jurisprudence enables us to see first, that the neutral/specific 
distinction is not a binary one, and second, that we need to be more 
accurate in describing the law. 
                                                
82 Meurer, supra note 55, at 706. 
83 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
84 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (explaining the 
doctrine of content neutrality and applying it to must-carry rules in the 
telecommunications sector). 
85 See e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 214 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 430 (Stevens, J., concurring). For a critical 
discussion, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of 
Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 49 (2000). 
86 In the case of copyright law, we can argue that the anti-circumvention rules 
are a violation of speech, which would call for the direct application of the 
content-based/content-neutral distinction. See my argument in Michael D. 
Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech after Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1275, 1314, 1316, 1330 (2003). Netanel made a similar argument 
regarding the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998. See Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2001). In the context of privacy, the reference to free speech doctrines 
is as an analogy, not a direct application thereof. 
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 4. Who regulates technology? 
A final relevant parameter, echoing the consideration of 
flexibility in choosing the suitable legislative technique, is 
questioning who sets the rules and who applies them. The 
candidates are the legislature, the executive branch—a regulator of 
a specific sector in most cases87—and the judiciary. 
A typical structure is that the law is technology-neutral in 
text but becomes specific in application. The specification can be 
based on the kind of technology, or it can address a specific 
technology. This is, for example, the case in patent law and 
surveillance law, mentioned above.88 In such cases, there is a 
constitutional division of labor between the legislature and the 
judiciary, which might mitigate some of the criticism voiced 
against the technology-neutral position. The ex post specification 
by the courts adds certainty and foreseeability, thus minimizing the 
chilling effect, if one exists. 
D. Interim Summary 
There are three main considerations that legislators should 
weigh when drafting legislation and choosing a legislative 
technique: flexibility, innovation, and harmonization. If these three 
considerations apply to the circumstances of a particular issue, they 
can justify the choice for technology-neutral legislation. Once a 
legislature opts for a neutral position, there are further choices to 
make. Instead of a binary choice of all or nothing, I argued that 
there are several continuums available that provide a richer set of 
options: a law can treat technology at any point on the end—means 
spectrum, the promotion—restriction spectrum, and the abstract—
concrete spectrum, and it can allocate responsibility for different 
segments of these choices to different players in the legal field. 
Considering the best mode of legislative technique not in the 
abstract, but vis-à-vis the matrix of possibilities, can yield more 
nuanced options and hopefully better results. 
However, in practice, we see that technology-neutral 
legislation is often preferred a-priori, without considering the 
various justifications and parameters discussed above. The 
advantages of neutrality are taken for granted. Laws are phrased in 
a neutral way and the legislators present them as such. But 
returning to the paradox presented at the outset of this article: is 
                                                
87 Susan Brenner points to the current state of the law regarding nanotechnology. 
There is no one law that addresses it, but there are three federal agencies that 
claim authority to regulate certain aspects thereof. See Brenner, supra note 57, at 
50. 
88 See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 51; Kerr, supra note 39. 
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neutrality possible at all? We should ask this question when the 
legislature strives for legislative neutrality, either intuitively or 
after a thorough deliberation. To better understand this question, I 
suggest that we reverse engineer the law, to which I now turn. 
III.  REVERSE ENGINEERING THE LAW 
Some laws reveal their technological mindset, as they 
address a specific technology directly. There is not much need to 
reverse engineer such laws (unless we are suspicious about the 
statutory statements): what we see is what we get. A law that 
would regulate Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags 
exclusively (there is no such law that I am aware of) would assume 
the RFID technology. Other laws attempt, whether self-
consciously or not, to conceal their technological mindset. One 
way to do so is to draft the legislation in a technology-neutral 
manner, so that it applies not only to one particular technology but 
to other known or future technologies as well. However, such a 
position means that the law tries to resist its own biases and its 
own technological mindset. Is it possible for the law to think 
beyond the current state of the art? The challenge for the 
legislators is to realize the limits of technological neutrality; the 
challenge for the researcher is to examine the validity of the 
claimed neutrality. This Part undertakes the latter task and offers a 
general mode of statutory interpretation, tailored to technological 
contexts. 
Technology-related laws assume a technological context. 
Otherwise, they would be superfluous. Contract law has an 
underlying vision of how contracts are formed or should be 
formed. Without such a vision regarding its subject matter, 
contract law would be an incoherent set of arbitrary rules. Criminal 
law reflects an understanding of crime, harm and punishment. 
Without such a vision, criminal law would be nothing but the 
sovereign’s arbitrary and capricious command. We can go on to 
consider other fields of law: what is each field’s vision regarding 
its subject matter? Rarely is it explicitly stated, but it is always 
present.  
As the examples of contract law and criminal law illustrate, 
it is often the case that the law’s vision about its subject matter is 
not explicit. Moreover, the law’s underlying mindset about its 
subject matter might be biased in one way or another, be 
incoherent, or simply wrong. Imagine contract lawyers trying to 
answer the question about the law’s underlying perception of how 
contracts are formed. To figure out the hidden assumptions, we 
should look deeper. 
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 Moreover, every field of law has a vision as to technology. 
Contract law, for example, holds various technological 
assumptions about the means of communications of the parties 
(oral/writing, synchronous or asynchronous), the formation of the 
contract (shaking hands, signing documents or exchanging emails) 
and its form (oral, written, digital). Here, I focus on laws that 
address technology more directly. The law in general, and 
technology-related laws in particular, holds a hidden technological 
assumption.89 Katherine Strandburg argues, for example, that the 
Fourth Amendment, drafted with the idea of a physical home in 
mind, should be extended to cover the networked world. She 
implies technosocial continuity, which “consider[s] the intertwined 
effects of technological and social change.”90 
This is where reverse engineering of the law enters the 
picture. It is an interpretive methodology that can assist us in 
uncovering the hidden assumptions of the law about technology. 
The metaphor of reverse engineering is borrowed from computer 
science and trade secret law. It is inspired by the rich 
jurisprudential discourse about interpretation of laws and 
hermeneutics and, more specifically, by one strand of literary 
criticism. 
Computer scientists and engineers reverse engineer 
software and end-products, with the intention of figuring out how 
the product was designed and what its internal logic, mechanism 
and underlying ideas are. Reverse engineering begins with the end-
product rather than with the original code or design and works 
backwards, in a reverse direction. Reverse engineering is done 
either because there is no access to the original plans (due to 
technological barriers or since it is kept secret) or because the 
process itself provides an important learning experience.91 The 
underlying ideas and concepts are not protected by copyright law 
and they are often needed to achieve interoperability.92 Trade 
                                                
89 See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605 (2007) 
(arguing that the law often relies on latent structural constraints, which are 
physical or technological barriers which regulate conduct). 
90 Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth 
Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 619 
(2011); see also Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011) (arguing that Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence reflects a judicial reaction to new technologies). 
91 The philosophy of the Free Software movement includes four freedoms, the 
second of which is “[t]he freedom to study how the program works.” See What 
is free software?, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/ 
free-sw.html (last updated July 2, 2012). 
92 See Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 
1992) (concluding that “when the person seeking the understanding has a 
legitimate reason for doing so and when no other means of access to the 
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secret law permits such reverse engineering.93 A special defense in 
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 allows reverse 
engineering.94 When the process requires temporary copying, 
copyright law’s fair use defense (subject to its considerations) as 
well as specific statutory permissions might apply.95 All of these 
legal mechanisms support reverse engineering. 
Applying reverse engineering to the reading of the law 
means that we begin with the text of the legislation and work 
backwards, in order to decipher its conceptual building blocks. 
One way to uncover the foundations is to turn to external evidence. 
This is the kind of research that legal historians or political 
scientists often engage in. Reverse engineering the law is not 
interested in the history of the law per se (though historical 
analysis can be highly beneficial). Instead, it is interested in the 
end-product: what the legislators finally did regarding technology, 
not what they intended. 
The parallel to the textualist mode of legal interpretation is 
obvious, but reverse engineering is not such a textualist exercise. 
Some jurists argue that the meaning of the law is confined to its 
text.96 They refuse to query the original meaning of those who 
drafted the law and they firmly resist injecting contemporary ideas 
into the text. The textualist interpretation reads the plain text of the 
law and seeks other clues within the text for its meaning, such as 
the repeated use of terms, division into sections, etc. The textualist 
methodology reflects a long line of presuppositions as to the 
meaning of law, the authority of the interpreter, and much more.97 
th 
                                                                                                         
unprotected elements exists, such disassembly is as a matter of law a fair use of 
the copyrighted work”). 
93 See California Uniform Trade Secrets Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West 
1985), which lists reverse engineering as an example of proper means to acquire 
knowledge of a trade secret. 
94 See 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1) (2006). 
95 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (fair use defense); Sega Enterprises, 977 F.2d 
1510, 1520-21; and the exceptions to the anti-circumvention rules that allow 
reverse engineering under certain conditions for purposes of achieving 
interoperability, encryption research and security testing, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)-
(h) (2006). 
96 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, 
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23 (Amy 
Gutman ed., 1997); Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the 
Framers’ Intention, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC 
READER 45 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). 
97 For a critical discussion, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A 
HERMENEUTIC READER, supra note 96, at 69. Other interpretive modes do not 
necessarily ignore the text; quite to the contrary, but they focus on the text in 
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The text-based interpretation has practical implications, as it serves 
those who apply it to determine what the law is. 
Reverse engineering the law applies some of the same tools 
used by the textualists, in that it confines itself to the text of the 
legislation, it does not seek the history of the law, and it does not 
turn to other external evidence about the meaning of the law. But 
the reverse engineering of the law does not rule out alternative 
modes of interpretation and does not have a normative claim of 
exclusivity; in fact, it does not have any normative claim (other 
than the assumption that the law reflects a technological setting). 
The reverse engineering is a tool in the service of description: it is 
interested in exposing underlying technological assumptions that 
were built in the law or that the law was built around. In this sense, 
the reading I propose here searches for the law’s technological 
mindset rather than the mindset of its drafters. 
Reverse engineering the law has closer affinity with the 
New Criticism strand in literary criticism, which focused on the 
text.98 The interpretive convention that pre-dated the new criticism 
focused on the authors and their intentions. The new critics shifted 
the search for the meaning of the text from the author to the text 
itself. In order to figure out the meaning of a poem, a story, etc., 
the new critics refused to query the author’s intentions. Neither did 
they examine the way in which the text was received by the 
readers. Audience-based theories of interpretation appeared only 
later in the day.99 The new critics’ interpretive tool was a close 
reading, searching for internal structures of the text.100 
Reverse engineering the law thus begins with the text and 
tries to uncover the technological mindset, as reflected in the law. 
Reverse engineering the law does not insist on interpretive 
exclusivity. For example, it does not object to a historical analysis. 
It might not always provide us with a meaningful conclusion. But 
reverse engineering does carry potential explanatory power as to 
how the law thinks of the technology it regulates; it can teach us 
about the limits of the current law and provide us with some 
guidance as to the future. 
It is now time to return to the paradox that drives the 
current inquiry, which challenges the very possibility of 
                                                                                                         
relation to other interpretive nodes, such as the author of the text. See, e.g., 
Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, 
and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1254 (1997). 
98 For the New Criticism (or La Nouvelle Critique, in its French appearance), 
see, for example, TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 38-
42 (2d ed. 1996). 
99 See ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT (1978). 
100 See, e.g., EAGLETON, supra note 98. 
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technology-neutral laws. I shall examine this by turning to the case 
study of informational privacy law: is this body of law technology-
neutral? Does the law have an underlying technological mindset 
despite its purported neutrality? I first draw the legal framework of 
informational privacy and then reverse engineer the law. 
IV. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
Over the last four decades, we have witnessed the gradual 
emergence of a new legal regime addressing informational privacy. 
It is an offspring of the classical right to privacy, extending privacy 
beyond the tort of disclosing one’s private life. As a theoretical 
concept, informational privacy covers certain interests in “our” 
“private” or “personal” data. These terms are controversial. Some 
jurisdictions, namely Europe, use an identification-based criterion 
to define personal data,101 whereas other jurisdictions, namely the 
United States, use a content-based criterion. Although this is not a 
rigid distinction, from a legal and practical point of view, the 
informational prong of privacy law developed differently in the 
United States than in Europe, providing us with two main models: 
a sectoral approach in the United States and an omnibus one in 
Europe, known as data protection law. The former model means 
that informational privacy is protected only in an enumerated set of 
cases, each protected by a specific (federal) law.102 The latter 
model means that informational privacy is protected across the 
board, not only in a specific sector or context.103 
                                                
101 The identification criterion first appeared in the ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF 
PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA OF 1980, §1(b) (1980) 
[hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES]: “‘personal data’ means any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable individual (data subject).” It was later 
adopted by the EU in its Data Protection Directive. 
102 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (health-related data); 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 
1338 (1999) (known as Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) (financial data); Video 
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (data about video rentals.); 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 
1232g (2006) (data about students’ records or information). There are only two 
federal informational privacy laws that have a general scope: the Privacy Act of 
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006), and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
of 1998 (COPPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2581 (1998). The scope of the 
former is determined according to the context and the identity of the parties: the 
government and citizens. The scope of the latter is determined according to the 
age (under 13) of the data subjects. 
103 There are various explanations in the literature for the different approaches. 
James Whitman, following Robert Post, provided a political/philosophical 
explanation: the European legislative scheme is based on the idea of human 
dignity, whereas the American is based on the idea of liberty. See James Q. 
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 This Part surveys the development of informational 
privacy/data protection as a legal category. The discussion 
provides the legal background for contemporary informational 
privacy law; explains the next Part’s reverse engineering of 
European data protection law and enables us to elucidate from the 
discussion the recurring features of the emerging global 
informational privacy regime. 
A. United States: Privacy and Private Information 
The right to privacy is not enumerated in the Constitution 
or in the Bill of Rights. The founding fathers left privacy to the 
states and to the social realm, with the important exception of the 
Fourth Amendment, which regulates governmental searches and 
seizures. Privacy is further protected via other legal rights, such as 
the right to private property, copyright law in unpublished works 
and more.  
As a legal right, privacy entered the common law with 
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s famous 1890 Harvard Law 
Review article, The Right to Privacy.104 Seventy years later, Dean 
William Prosser classified the judicial incarnations of the right to 
privacy into four torts,105 later to be incorporated into the 
Restatement (Second) on Torts,106 resulting in the wide diffusion 
of the privacy tort throughout the United States.107 In the 
meantime, the right to privacy also gained power in the 
                                                                                                         
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
YALE L.J. 1151 (2004). Jon Mills points to the age of the American privacy law 
compared to the newly born EU; to the strength of freedom of speech in the 
United States, which trumps privacy; and to a stronger norm of governmental 
openness. See JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY – THE LOST RIGHT 273 (2008). Steven 
Salbu framed the legal discussion in the United States in terms of market-based 
solutions versus legislation and regulation. See Steven R. Salbu, The European 
Union Data Privacy Directive and International Relations, 35 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 655, 666-67 (2002). Helen Nissenbaum offers a theoretical 
support for the American sectoral approach to informational privacy. See HELEN 
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010). She proposes a comprehensive theoretical 
framework for privacy, which is anchored in social context. The context-based 
framework nicely fits the American sectoral approach, as a specific law for each 
sector can, at least potentially, be sensitive to the social context. Id. at 237-38. 
For critique, see Michael D. Birnhack, A Quest for a Theory of Privacy: Context 
and Control, 51 JURIMETRICS 447 (2011). 
104 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
105 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1997). 
107 For a critical assessment of Prosser’s formulation of privacy torts, see Neil 
M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 
CAL. L. REV. 1887 (2010). 
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constitutional context, namely in the relationship between state and 
citizen. The Supreme Court found that “various guarantees [in the 
Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy,”108 and developed the right 
to privacy, mostly in two contexts. One was decisional privacy, 
referring to matters such as a woman’s right to have an abortion,109 
and the second was Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.110  
The early 1970s saw a new development in the United 
States. In 1973, an Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare published a report (known as the Ware 
Report) that recommended regulating the collection and use of 
individuals’ data by enacting a Federal Code of Fair Information 
Practice (FIP) for all automated personal data systems. 
Interestingly, in anticipating the discussion in the next Part, the 
committee was concerned first and foremost with the challenges of 
a particular kind of then-new technology: computer-based record 
keeping systems, or, in language that would become popular later, 
databases. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Caspar 
W. Weinberger, saw even further. His Foreword to the Report 
started with a technological vision: “Computers linked together 
through high-speed telecommunications networks are destined to 
become the principal medium for making, storing, and using 
records about people.”111 Note that this was in 1973 – only four 
years after the first distant computers were connected and long 
before we called it the Internet. It is also interesting to note 
Weinberger’s formulation of the issue: he described the benefits of 
the computer-based systems in terms of powerful management 
tools, and the rival interests in terms of “protections of due 
process” rights.112 He himself did not mention privacy, although 
the Committee did discuss privacy throughout the report. 
The Ware Report listed five basic principles: (1) there 
should be no secret personal data keeping systems; (2) an 
individual should be able to know whether information about him 
is kept and for what purpose; (3) an individual should be able to 
                                                
108 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
109 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
110 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), 
which articulated the “reasonable expectations” test that triggers Fourth 
Amendment protection. For a recent application, see United States v. Jones, No. 
10–1259, 2012 WL 171117 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012), (finding that police attachment 
of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle 
and monitoring the vehicle’s movements is a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
111 Caspar W. Weinberger, Foreword: Records, Computers and the Rights of 
Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal 
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 prevent 
prevent data from being used for a purpose different from that for 
which the data was collected in the first place; (4) an individual 
should be able to amend a record of identifiable information about 
him; and (5) a duty should be imposed on the organization that 
collects or uses the data to assure the reliability of the data, its use 
for the limited-purpose and prevent misuse.113 This was the debut 
of FIPs. In contemporary language, we can rephrase the principles 
slightly: (1) no secret databases; (2) a data subject’s right to access 
his or her personal data; (3) limited-purpose principle; (4) a data 
subject’s right to rectify incorrect personal data; and (5) duties of 
accuracy, limited purpose, and data security, imposed on 
controllers and processors of personal data. 
A year after the Ware Report was submitted, with the 
Watergate scandal in the background, Congress enacted the 
Privacy Act of 1974, which regulates the disclosure of records on 
American citizens by governmental agencies.114 This was the first 
federal law that provided explicit privacy protection to personal 
data.115 While in the United States the introduction of FIPs was in 
the context of public law, framing the government-citizen 
relationship, the principles soon found their way to the private 
realm. Privacy was now discussed in new circles: the forum shifted 
from the local sphere to the international one. In the United States, 
the law remained within the confines of specific sectors. When, in 
2011, the majority in the Supreme Court assumed, without 
deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy “interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”116 Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence clarified that “there is no constitutional right to 
‘informational privacy.’”117 
B. The OECD and Data Protection in Europe 
1. International Initiatives 
                                                
113 Id. Ch. III. 
114 Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). The legislative history is 1466 pages 
long. See S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS & H. COMM. ON 
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, S. 3418 (PUBLIC LAW 93-579): SOURCE BOOK ON 
PRIVACY (1976), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-
1974.pdf. 
115 Surveillance laws pre-dated the Privacy Act of 1974. Such laws regulated 
wiretapping and hence protected privacy interests. However, the interest was 
privacy in communications, rather than privacy in information per se. 
116 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)). 
117 Id. at 765.  
36
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 15 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol15/iss1/3
15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 24 (2012)          2012-2013 
 
 60 
In the meantime, several countries have already enacted 
laws regulating personal data.118 In 1980 the OECD published its 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data.119 With the growing global interest in 
informational privacy, the Council of Europe (CoE) offered the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1981.120 The 
Convention was also anchored in the main legal instrument of the 
CoE, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) of 1950.121 Article 8 thereof 
provides that “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.”122 Rephrased in the 
terms used here, the ECHR provides protection of privacy in 
several categories: informational privacy (private life), specific, 
content-based categories (family life), privacy in places (home), 
and privacy in communications (correspondence). The United 
Nations entered the picture in 1990, offering its Guidelines for the 
Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files to all nations.123 
None of these international instruments were binding for any 
country (other than the CoE Convention, which applied to 
countries that chose to ratify it). The OECD and UN guidelines 
were recommendations, indicating a path and reinforcing FIPs. 
 
                                                
118 The German State of Hesse was the first (1970); Sweden followed by 
enacting a data protection law in 1973. See the brief account of the first data 
protection commissioner, Spiros Simitis, Privacy – An Endless Debate?, 98 
CAL. L. REV. 1989, 1995-96 (2010). Other countries established expert 
committees recommending the enactment of such laws; for example in Canada 
(1972), UK (1972), and Israel (1981).  
119 OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 101, part 2. The Guidelines included eight 
principles: (1) data collection should be lawful and fair, with knowledge and 
consent where appropriate; (2) the data collected should be relevant to the 
purpose of its collection, accurate, complete and up to date; (3) the purpose of 
collection should be made at the time of collection and the data should be used 
for that purpose only; (4) the use should be limited to that purpose, with 
exceptions of the data subject’s consent or a legal authority; (5) a duty of data 
security; (6) data subjects should be able find out about their data, its uses and 
about the data controller; (7) individuals’ rights of access and rectification; and 
(8) accountability of the data controller. 
120 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 10, 1985,  E.T.S. No. 108. 
121 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered 
into force Sep. 3, 1953), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ D5CC24A7-
DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
122 Id. 
123 G.A. Res. 44/132, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/44/132, at 211 (Dec. 5, 1989).   
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 2. Enter the European Union 
The first to adopt the idea of protecting personal data as a 
comprehensive and binding legal regime was the European 
Community (EC), the predecessor of the European Union (EU). 
Several years of discussions resulted in the EU Directive on Data 
Protection of 1995.124 The Directive has become the most powerful 
engine of promoting data protection on a global scale. It is binding 
on the EU’s Member States, which were required to enact national 
laws that met the Directive’s imperatives,125 but its impact has 
reached beyond the borders of Europe.126 
Overall, the Directive has two goals. One is the protection 
of data and the second, often overlooked or underestimated, is the 
facilitation of cross-border transfers of data. These two goals might 
seem to contradict each other, as the best way to enable cross-
border data is not to attach any strings to it. The Directive attempts 
to calibrate a delicate balance between the two goals: it is a means 
to encourage commerce of personal data in a manner that protects 
the data subjects’ rights. 
The Directive provides a framework that imposes duties on 
those who handle the personal data and provides rights to the data 
subjects regarding their data, accompanied by some enforcement 
mechanisms. The basic principle is that personal data should be 
processed fairly and lawfully.127 This overarching principle is then 
made more concrete in a series of specific limitations imposed on 
data controllers and rights accorded to data subjects. The key 
construct of the Directive is its definition of “personal data” (Art. 
2(a)), which is based on an identification criterion rather than a 
content-based one.  
The processing of personal data is allowed only if the data 
subject has unambiguously given his consent; in a few other 
situations where consent is inferred (as in the case of a contract); or 
for exogenous reasons, such as a compliance with a legal 
obligation, protecting the data subject, or carrying out a task that is 
in the public interest.128 Further limitations include that personal 
data can be collected only for specific, explicit and legitimate 
purposes;129 it should not be further processed in ways that are 
                                                
124 See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1. 
125 The Directive does not directly apply in any of the legal systems of the EU 
member states. An Italian citizen, for example, cannot turn to an Italian court 
claiming her rights under the Directive were violated; she needs to point to the 
local Italian data protection law. 
126 See Birnhack, supra note 10. 
127 See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, art. 6(1)(a). 
128 Id. art. 7. 
129 Id. art. 6(1)(b). 
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incompatible with the original purposes;130 the data collected 
should be adequate, relevant, and not exceed the data needed to  
fulfill the purpose of its collection;131 and the data should be 
accurate and kept up to date.132 
There are further requirements, including prohibition 
against processing some kinds of data—here the criterion is 
content-based: racial origins, political beliefs, health data, and 
sexuality are prohibited categories, with some exceptions based on 
the data subject’s explicit consent.133 The data controller is further 
subject to duties of confidentiality and data security.134 The data 
subject’s rights correspond to the duties of the controllers. In 
addition, the data subject has an independent right to access the 
data held by the controller about her,135 to object to some 
processing,136 and to object to automated decisions.137 
The Directive and the legal regime of data protection it 
established were later anchored in constitutional grounds. Article 7 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 
2000 provides protection for privacy, stating “[e]veryone has the 
right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications.”138 Data protection deserved a separate 
constitutional status. Article 8(1) states that “[e]veryone has the 
right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.” 
Article 8(2) elaborates that  
Such data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis 
laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access 
to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified.  
A piece of supplementary EU legislation is the 2002 
Directive on privacy and electronic communications as amended in 
2009, often referred to as the e-Privacy Directive (hereinafter “e-
Privacy Directive”).139 It addresses privacy issues specific to the 
                                                
130 Id. 
131 Id. art. 6(1)(c). 
132 Id. art. 6(1)(d). 
133 Id. art. 8. 
134 Id. arts. 16,17. 
135 Id. art. 12. 
136 Id. art. 14. 
137 Id. art. 15. 
138 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. 
139 Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 
2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy 
in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC). The 
39
Birnhack: Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
REVERSE ENGINEERING INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY LAW 
63 
  
telecommunications sector. For example, it requires providers of 
“publicly available electronic communications service” to secure 
their systems; 140 it sets a right to receive a non-itemized bill;141 
and regulates unsolicited communications.142 In the terms provided 
previously in this article and to anticipate the following discussion, 
we can say that the e-Privacy Directive is technology-based. 
Although it does not name particular kinds of equipment or 
hardware, it is far from being technology-neutral. The definitions 
are on occasion at pains to describe a simple technology in a 
general manner. For example, the 2009 amendment refers to “the 
storing of information, or the gaining of access to information 
already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or 
user.”143 This seemingly broad definition covers cookies, spyware 
and viruses.144 It uses open language, but its technological contours 
are quite specific. 
3. The EU Directive: The Law Follows 
Personal Data 
The Data Protection Directive has a unique mechanism to 
export itself to other jurisdictions beyond the borders of the EU. It 
allows the transfer of personal data on European citizens to non-
EU countries only if the data receives a similar EU-level of 
protection in the country of destination.145 Such a mechanism is 
important, as it prevents the bypassing of the local legal regime by 
way of foreign data havens.146 
The Directive offers several mechanisms to ensure that the 
interests of European citizens are not compromised by a party 
located in a third country. The mechanisms include the consent of 
                                                                                                         
Directive was amended in 2009, by Directive 2009/136 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, O.J. (L 337) 11 (EC) 
[hereinafter Amending Directive]. The Amending Directive adds a duty to notify 
authorities and, if relevant, data subjects, of data breaches. The amendment also 
requires the user’s consent before storing or accessing information in his or her 
terminal equipment – in other words, before using cookies. Id. 
140  Directive 2002/56, supra note 139, art.4. 
141 Id. art. 7. 
142 Id. art. 13. 
143 Amending Directive, art. 2(5), amending art. 5(3) of the e-Privacy Directive. 
144 See id. Recital 66 (listing these as examples). 
145 See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, art. 25. 
146 PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD 
DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY 
DIRECTIVE 26 (1998). 
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the data subject (between the subject and a data controller),147 
standard contractual clauses (between two controllers),148 or  
Binding Corporate Rules (for multinational corporations).149 Yet 
another mechanism is more general in scope. It streamlines the 
data transfer to a third country if the law in that country provides 
an adequate level of protection. The EU conducts “adequacy 
assessments.” Adequacy does not mean that the law in the third 
party is identical to the Directive.150 This export mechanism means 
that the European law follows European personal data. It does not 
force itself onto other countries and does not bind any unwilling 
country, but it does offer an incentive to follow the European 
standard. 
Several countries and a few specific schemes have been 
recognized as having adequate data protection, albeit at a slow 
pace.151 Other countries amended their laws towards the EU’s 
stand  
                                                
147 See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, art. 26(1)(a). 
148 Id. arts. 26(2), (4). This avenue has been under-used. See Commission Staff 
Working Document on the Implementation of the Commission Decisions on 
Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third 
Countries (2001/497/EC and 2002/16/EC), SEC (2006) 95 final (Jan. 20, 2006),   
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/modelcontracts/sec_2006_95_e
n.pdf, on the implementation of the Commission decisions on standard 
contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries. 
149 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, art. 26(2). Over the years, the Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party [hereinafter Art. 29 DPWP], has issued 
explanations and clarifications about this process. See, for example, Art. 29 
DPWP, Working Document: Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: 
Applying Article 26(2) of the EU Data Protection Directive to Binding 
Corporate Rules for International Data Transfers, WP 74 (June 3, 2003), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp74 
_en.pdf  (setting guidelines for approval of BCRs); Art. 29 DPWP, Working 
Document Establishing a Model Checklist Application for Approval of Binding 
Corporate Rules, WP 108 (Apr. 14, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp108_en.pdf (evaluating the 
process, finding it to be long, cumbersome, and expensive, and suggesting ways 
to streamline the process). In 2010, the EU Commission updated its decision on 
the matter, to address the increasing practice of global outsourcing of data 
processing. See Art. 29 DPWP, Opinion 3/2009 on the Draft Commission 
Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to 
Processors Established in Third Countries, Under Directive 95/46/EC (data 
controller to data processor), WP 161 (Mar. 5, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/ justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp161_en.pdf .  
150 Art. 29 DPWP, Party Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: 
Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive, WP 12, at 5 
(July 24,1998), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1998/ 
wp12_en.pdf. 
151 These include inter alia Switzerland (recognized in 1999), Argentina 
(recognized in 2002), Canada (recognized in 2002), Israel (recognized in 2010), 
Uruguay (recognized in 2010) and a handful of small island nations. For the full 
list, see Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal 
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standards, including Australia, South Africa, India, Turkey, Japan 
and several South American countries.152 The overall result is a 
mechanism of soft legal globalization: the law is spread around the 
globe but not in a hard, binding manner. 
The Directive’s effect in the United States is more subtle. 
Thus far, two American schemes earned the European “adequacy” 
status. The first was the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor program, which 
created a voluntary framework for American corporations to 
declare that they adhere to the EU’s data protection standards, a 
statement that is then subject to the FTC’s power to investigate and 
regulate deceptive presentations.153 Thus, a segment of leading 
American corporations, including Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, 
Microsoft and Yahoo! committed to follow European rules.154 A 
second scheme was more specific, regarding the transfer of 
Passenger Name Records (PNR) from the EU to the U.S. as part of 
anti-terror measures.155 
Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan studied 
American privacy practices and discussed the growing attention to 
data protection issues in corporate America.156 They found that 
despite the common view that the American privacy law on the 
books is inadequate, especially when compared to the European 
model, the law “on the ground” does provide privacy protection. 
They argue that in the United States, informational privacy has 
                                                                                                         
Data in Third Countries, EUROPEAN COMM’N – JUSTICE, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/data-protection/document/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm 
(last updated Oct. 4, 2012). In 2011, a recommendation to declare New 
Zealand’s law adequate was advanced by the Article 29 DPWP. See Art. 29 
DPWP, Opinion 11/2011 on the Level of Protection of Personal Data in New 
Zealand, WP 182 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/ 
privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp182_en.pdf. 
152 See Birnhack, supra note 10, at 515-17; Graham Greenleaf, 83 Data Privacy 
Laws World Wide, in PRIVACY LAWS & BUSINESS – SPECIAL REPORT (2011). 
153 See Introduction to the U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, 
NAT’L EXPORT INITIATIVE, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ (last updated 
Apr. 11, 2012). 
154 As of February 10, 2012, the number of companies that adhered to the 
program is 3108. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor List, NAT’L EXPORT INITIATIVE,  
http://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (providing a list 
of companies that follow the framework). 
155 The negotiations between the U.S. and the EU took several years, with 
interim setbacks: in 2006 the European Court of Justice annulled the European 
Commission’s decision to recognize the agreement between the U.S. and the EU 
as adequate. See Case C-317/04, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-4721; 
Case C-318/04 Parliament v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. I-2467. A new agreement 
was then negotiated. See Council Decision (EC) 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July 
2007, O.J. (L 204) 16. 
156 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on 
the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011). 
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increasingly received more attention over 15 years (1994-2009). 
They attribute this growth to the role that the FTC undertook as a 
regulator of privacy; to the influence of privacy advocates, market 
and media pressures; and to the new profession of privacy 
officers.157 Bamberger and Mulligan identified several indirect 
European influences on American privacy in practice. One is the 
Safe Harbor Program.158 A second point of influence is directly on 
corporations conducting business with Europe.159 A third is the 
interest in smoothing interactions with European regulators, cited 
as one of the reasons for creating Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) 
positions in American firms.160 A fourth instance of European 
influence occurs when companies draft their global policies.161 The 
European standards, as they quote one of their interviewees, are the 
“highest common denominator.”162 Thus, the EU data protection 
scheme has not only had a direct effect on other countries’ laws, 
but also an indirect effect, by setting de facto commercial 
standards, on a global scale. 
To date, the Directive still reigns over all other global-scale 
regulatory approaches to data protection. Its mechanisms and 
power lie first in that it is hard law within the EU, binding its 27 
Member States (and also the three members of the European 
Economic Market), and second, in that it is soft law outside the 
EU, with direct and indirect influence on a growing number of 
other countries. At least for the time being, the Directive is the 
most influential data protection legislation on a global scale. Hence 
it will serve as the main case study and be subjected to “reverse 
engineering” in the next Part. 
4. New Initiatives and Proposals 
In recent years there have been new suggestions towards a 
global data protection regime, but thus far, they have not gained 
significant power. The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) offered a Privacy Framework in 2004 based on the 
principle of accountability of data controllers to data subjects;163  
                                                
157 Id. at 253. 
158 Id. at 262, 266, 285, 312. 
159 Id. at 265. 
160 Id. at 261-62. 
161 Id. at 269-70. 
162 Id. at 270. 
163 The principle of accountability appeared in the 1980 OECD Guidelines and 
has reemerged also in the EU. The Art. 29 DPWP proposed a concrete 
amendment to the Directive to include a principle of accountability that “would 
require data controllers to put in place appropriate and effective measures to 
ensure that the principles and obligations set out in the Directive are complied 
with and to demonstrate so to supervisory authorities upon request.” See Art. 29 
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the OECD attempted to re-enter the data protection world in 2007 
with a recommendation on international cooperation in enforcing 
privacy laws;164 and in 2009, the International Conference of Data 
Protection Commissioners adopted the Madrid Declaration on 
Global Privacy Standards for a Global World.165 While these 
suggestions received some attention by receiving EU support, they 
have yet to materialize into actual legal frameworks. 
Within the EU, there are discussions towards amending the 
1995 Directive. In January 2012, the EU Commission published a 
comprehensive proposal to enact a European Regulation on data 
protection to replace the 1995 Data Protection Directive.166 While 
a Directive obliges the Member States to enact national laws that 
apply the Directive’s principles, a Regulation is directly applicable. 
Thus, if adopted, the Regulation would achieve substantial 
harmonization within the EU. The proposed amendments repeat 
most of the Directive’s rules, but boost the rights of the data 
subjects, expand the duties imposed on the data controllers and 
processors, provide more and better enforcement tools, and suggest 
various organizational and governmental mechanisms. The 
legislative process is likely to take a few years. I will refer to it 
inasmuch as it implicates the issues discussed here. 
The proposals are to adopt new substantive principles, 
especially the principles of transparency and accountability, which 
would require data controllers to be more transparent about their 
data-related activities, so as to enable better enforcement of the 
duties imposed on data controllers.167 A second proposed principle 
which deserves much attention in the data protection world these 
days is that of Privacy-by-Design (PbD) (renamed data protection 
by design.)168 A third principle is the so-called “right to be 
                                                                                                         
DPWP, Opinion 3/2010 on the Principle of Accountability, WP 173, at 2 (July 
13, 2010); OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 101. Thus, the principle is seen as a 
means to promote enforcement.  
164 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), RECOMMENDATION 
ON CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS PROTECTING 
PRIVACY (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/ 
38770483.pdf. 
165 See Global Privacy Standards for a Global World, Madrid Privacy 
Declaration, THE PUBLIC VOICE (Nov. 3, 2009), http://thepublicvoice.org/ 
TheMadridPrivacyDeclaration.pdf. 
166 See Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6. 
167 See id. arts. 5(a) (general principles of personal data processing), 11 
(transparent communication to the data subject), 22 (responsibilities of the data 
controller). 
168 See id. art. 23. In 2010, the annual International Conference of Data 
Protection and Privacy Commissioners adopted PbD as its recommendation. See  
Resolution on Privacy by Design, 32ND INT’L CONFERENCE OF DATA PROT. AND 
PRIVACY COMM’RS  (Oct. 27-29, 2010), http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/ 
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forgotten,” which is the right to object to further processing of 
personal data or to require that the data be deleted.169 The 
Commission suggested yet another principle, of data portability, 
which would mean that users would be able to transfer their own 
data from one service provider to another, e.g., from one social 
network to another.170 
The European bodies explain the need to review the 
Directive in terms of the need to meet challenges of globalization 
and new technologies.171 However, many of the proposals are 
driven by internal EU changes and its perceived need for internal 
harmonization, as well as an interest in improving enforcement and 
dealing with new business models that challenge existing rules, 
such as the outsourcing of data processing to non-EU countries. 
Thus, the EU Directive is currently a global leader in data 
protection. It is a complex set of rules that are structured around 
the idea of FIPs. At present, the Directive has been the most 
influential legal instrument in the world of data protection. It is 
currently at an important junction, with concrete proposals to 
amend it. Hence, it serves as the subject of reverse engineering the 
law. 
V. REVERSE ENGINEERING THE DATA PROTECTION 
DIRECTIVE  
The European Commission and its professional arm, the 
Article 29 Working Party (somewhat unimaginatively named after 
Article 29 of the Directive), have announced more than once their 
view that the Data Protection Directive is technology-neutral. This 
Part scrutinizes these statements. Section A begins with a  
                                                                                                         
rdonlyres/F8A79347-170C-4EEF-A0AD-155554558A5F/26502/ResolutiononPr 
ivacybyDesign.pdf. 
169 Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6, art. 17. See also VICTOR MEYER-
SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE – THE VIRTUES OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
(2009). 
170 Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6, art. 18. Presumably, such a 
principle would, for example, require Facebook to enable users to export their 
data to Google Plus. The Commission provided social networks as an example, 
in the opening comments of the Proposed GDP Regulation. Id. recital 55. 
171 See id. recital 5 (“Rapid technological developments and globalisation have 
brought new challenges for the protection of personal data. The scale of data 
sharing and collecting has increased spectacularly. Technology allows both 
private companies and public authorities to make use of personal data on an 
unprecedented scale in order to pursue their activities. Individuals increasingly 
make personal information available publicly and globally. Technology has 
transformed both the economy and social life, and requires to further facilitate 
the free flow of data within the Union and the transfer to third countries and 
international organisations, while ensuring a high level of the protection of 
personal data.”). 
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discussion of the EU perspective on the relationship between 
technology and data protection law, a perspective that cherishes 
technology-neutral legislation. I then explain this perspective in the 
terms presented in Part III (technology-neutral/technology-specific 
legislative technique). Section B offers a reading of some of the 
legal and conceptual building blocks of the Directive. I advance 
the argument that the Directive is better understood as 
“technology-based but viewpoint-neutral,” in that it assumes a 
specific technological environment,  though on a rather abstract 
level. Along the way, I shall refer to the proposed EU Regulation, 
which the EU currently discusses as a replacement for the 
Directive, where relevant. 
A. The Directive and Technology 
The European Union firmly believes that its data protection 
law is technology-neutral. The various European bodies that 
administer the Directive are well aware of its complex relationship 
with technology. A 2003 Review of the Directive stated that 
“[d]espite the doubts raised during the negotiation of the Directive, 
Member States have thus reached the conclusion that the 
Directive’s ambition to be technology-neutral is achieved, at least 
as regards the processing of sound and image data.”172 A 2009 
report of the Article 29 Working Party concluded that “Directive 
95/46/EC has stood well the influx of these technological 
developments because it holds principles and uses concepts that 
are not only sound but also technologically neutral. Such principles 
and concepts remain equally relevant, valid and applicable in 
today’s networked world.”173 A 2010 Communication of the 
European Commission commented that “[t]he findings [of the 
EU’s review of the current legal framework] confirmed that the 
core principles of the Directive are still valid and that its 
technologically neutral character should be preserved. However, 
several issues were identified as being problematic and posing 
specific challenges.”174 External observers also pointed to the 
technol 
                                                
172 See Comm’n of the European Communities, First Report on the 
Implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), at 20, COM (2003) 
265 final (May 15, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Review]. 
173 See Art. 29 DPWP & Working Party on Police and Justice, The Future of 
Privacy - Joint Contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission 
on the Legal Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of Personal 
Data, WP 168, at 3 (2009) [hereinafter WP 168]. 
174 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The 
Council, The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
- A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European 
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technology-neutral position of the Directive as one of its 
strengths.175 
The European Union believes that the principled neutrality 
has enabled the Directive to remain valid almost two decades after 
it was first discussed. The following passage from a 2009 report of 
the Article 29 Working Party is telling: 
The basic concepts of Directive 95/46/EC were 
developed in the nineteen seventies, when 
information processing was characterized by card 
index boxes, punch cards and mainframe 
computers. Today computing is ubiquitous, global 
and networked. Information technology devices are 
increasingly: miniaturized and equipped with 
network cards, WiFi or other radio interfaces. In 
almost all offices and family homes users can 
globally communicate via the Internet. Web 2.0 
services and cloud computing are blurring the 
distinction between data controllers, processors and 
data subjects. 
Directive 95/46/EC has stood well the influx 
of these technological developments because it 
holds principles and uses concepts that are not only 
sound but also technologically neutral. Such 
principles and concepts remain equally relevant, 
valid and applicable in today’s networked world.176 
Thus, the data protection regulators believe the Directive is 
technology-neutral and emphasize its flexibility. Their conclusion 
is that the Directive does require some amendments,177 but none 
are radical, in terms of the fundamental principles or the 
assumption as to the underlying technologies. Moreover, the EU 
Commission believes neutrality is crucial. In its proposed 
Regulation, it states that “[t]he protection of individuals should be 
technologically neutral and not depend on the techniques used; 
otherwise this would create a serious risk of circumvention.”178 
The example provided in the proposed Regulation is about manual 
processing, which should also be subject to the Regulation, if the          
                                                                                                         
Union, at 3, COM (2010) 609 final (Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter COM (2010) 
609]. 
175 See, e.g., NEIL ROBINSON, ET AL., REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN DATA 
PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 24 (2009); id. at 22 (attributing the Directive’s 
sustainability to its principle-based framework). 
176 WP 168, supra note 173, ¶¶ 41-42. 
177 See COM (2010) 609, supra note 174, at 18; WP 168, supra note 173. 
178 See Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6, recital 13. 
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processing aims to create a database (“filing system”).179  
The Directive’s key constructs are all phrased in general 
language. These building blocks include the definitions of personal 
data, data controller, and processor as well as a structure of 
according some rights to data subjects, imposing duties on the 
controllers, and creating dual private and regulatory enforcement 
mechanisms. The Directive does not speak of any particular 
technological method of collecting or processing data. The choice 
of a technology-neutral legislative technique surely has made a 
substantial contribution to the Directive’s sustainability, though 
there are probably additional factors that made the Directive 
resilient to technological changes.180 
The Directive’s technology-related choices fit the 
considerations mentioned earlier, especially those of flexibility and 
harmonization. The need for flexibility is obvious, and the 
founders of the Directive are aware of it. Harmonization is crucial 
once we take into consideration the European political map. The 
Directive is a general piece of legislation directed at the Member 
States of the EU, rather than at local courts. To achieve 
harmonization among the Member States, a much sought-after goal 
of the EU, the Directive could choose a rather abstract language, or 
alternatively, it could be replaced with a directly applicable 
Regulation. The political form of the Directive further means that 
the national legislatures and regulators enjoy a margin of 
appreciation, to use European parlance, meaning that they have the 
permission and leeway to take more concrete stances, as long as 
they are in line with the Directive. Interestingly, the European 
discourse on data protection goes beyond harmonization within the 
EU and in recent years has included discussion of the global 
dimension. As for consideration of innovation, thus far this has not 
been part of the European discourse on the Directive’s 
technological neutrality. The proposed Regulation mentions 
innovation in an almost inadvertent manner.181 
                                                
179 Id. 
180 An important factor that explains the Directive’s continuing relevance and 
power is its combination of being mandatory within the EU and its sophisticated 
export mechanism in the form of what I call soft legal globalization. The 
weakness of the national and international alternatives (the OECD Guidelines, 
the CoE Convention, the UN Guidelines, the APEC Framework, and the data 
commissioners’ declarations) provide yet another explanation for the Directive’s 
resilience. 
181 In the explanatory note, the Proposed GDP Regulation mentions that lack of 
trust in the online environment “risks slowing down the development of 
innovative uses of new technologies.” Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6, 
at 1. In the context of data security rules, the proposal states that “the 
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But what sort of technology neutrality does the EU apply? 
Phrased in the typology offered earlier, we can characterize it as 
the following: first, on the end-means continuum, the subject 
matter of the Directive is data protection. Unlike patent law or e-
commerce legislation, the Directive is not meant to regulate 
technology directly. Neither is technology perceived as a means to 
achieve the goal (subject to the exception of Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (PETs) and Privacy by Design (PbD)). Instead, the 
Directive treats technology as a given fact, acknowledging that 
various technologies affect the possibilities and practices of data 
collection, processing and transfer. Accordingly, as far as personal 
data is regulated directly, technology is taken for granted, as if it 
were a closed “black box”: the Commission does not know what is 
inside the box and hence defines its content in general terms – 
namely, technology-neutral terms. Nevertheless, as I will show 
later, there are some hidden assumptions as to the contents of this 
box. 
Second, on the promotion-restriction continuum, the 
Directive is placed in a safe place in the middle: it passively 
permits new technologies. The Directive does not actively promote 
new technologies, nor does it restrict them. In fact, the Directive 
does not say anything about the technologies themselves. It sets its 
principles as to what human (as well as corporate and perhaps 
governmental) players can or cannot do with the technologies. The 
duties and rights are all based on general principles (which are 
concretizations of the overarching principle of fairness and 
lawfulness) and on general functions (e.g., the purpose limitation 
principle). 
Third, on the abstraction-concretization continuum, the 
Directive seems to have chosen a rather abstract position. No 
specific technologies are mentioned. The Directive opted for a 
technology-neutral language. However, as I shall argue in the next 
section, the Directive is less neutral than this first impression 
would suggest. 
The proposed Regulation also focuses on data protection. It 
states that the new technologies are the trigger for the proposal, but 
in the same breath, the proposal explicitly adheres to the principle 
of technology neutrality. The proposed Regulation does cite 
several specific technologies: it mentions the Internet and tracking 
technologies,182 and more specifically, “online identifiers,” such as  
                                                                                                         
Commission should promote technological neutrality, interoperability and 
innovation.” Id. recital 66. 
182 Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6, recital 21. 
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Internet Protocol addresses and cookies.183 The Internet is also a 
prime example in the case of the right to be forgotten,184 and in the 
discussion of some business models, such as online advertising.185 
Social networks are provided as an example for the need for data 
portability; namely, the subject’s right to switch from one social 
network to another with his or her data.186 Another important 
principle embraced by the proposal is that of PbD: data controllers 
will be required to implement such measures.187 The PbD principle 
does not dictate a particular technology to be used, but it does 
assume that technology is embedded with social values and thus 
that it is regulable. 
B. The Directive and Technology Neutrality 
Reverse engineering the Data Protection Directive 
questions whether or not the Directive is actually technology-
neutral. The skepticism which I apply here is instrumental, meant 
to serve as a tool to expose the technological mindset within which 
the Directive was drafted and within which it operates. 
The Directive does use technology-neutral language. Its 
only direct explicit reference to technology is in Article 33, where 
it instructed the Commission to examine the Directive’s 
application “to data processing of sound and image data,” and 
submit proposals that would take into account “development in 
information technology.”188 Later on, the Commission reached the 
conclusion that the Directive does cover sound and image data.189 
In this sense the Directive is technology-neutral and can 
encompass health-related data, financial data, and genetic data, 
collected or processed in, for example, a computer, network or 
biometric manner. But, a closer view reveals that the Directive 
assumes a general structure about personal data: what is its nature 
and what happens to it. More specifically, the Directive assumes a 
linear life cycle of personal data. It assumes a sequence of 
                                                
183 Id. at recital 24. 
184 See id. at recital 53. 
185 See id. at recital 46. 
186 See id. at recital 55. 
187 See id. at art. 23, recital 61. 
188 See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at art. 33. 
189 See 2003 Review, supra note 172, § 5, at 20; see also Article 29 DPWP, 
Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, at 7 (June 20, 2007) 
[hereinafter WP 136] (concluding that sound and image data qualify as 
“personal data”). For a discussion of sound and image data under the Directive, 
see Jacqueline D. Lipton, Digital Multi-Media and the Limits of Privacy Law, 42 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 551 (2010), which argues that existing privacy law, 
including the Directive, focuses on text-based personal records. 
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collection, processing and transfer of personal data, all of which 
take place between two parties. This is a technological assumption, 
as it is based on the technologies that were available in the 1970s 
and still persist. But new technologies might change the sequence. 
A second technological assumption is that the personal data has a 
destination: to be part of a database. The idea of a database is a 
formative one in the Directive’s structure. 
The Directive and its entire data protection regime operate 
within this technological paradigm. It is broad enough and still 
valid to a large extent so as to capture both the form of data 
processing of the 1970s and of the early 2010s, but we are 
beginning to see its limits. From this point of view, we are not yet 
experiencing a technological paradigm shift, but there are signs 
that such a shift is likely to occur in the not too distant future. 
To make the case, I discuss the definitions of personal data, 
processing of personal data, and personal data filing systems. 
Along the discussion we will also meet the players whom the 
Directive envisions: the data subject, the data controller, and the 
data recipient. Together, these form the building blocks of the 
Directive and its legal structure. 
1. Personal Data 
The fundamental construct of the entire data protection 
legal regime is its definition of personal data, which is bundled 
with the definition of data subject: “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or 
to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity . . . .”190 
There are many interpretive questions about the scope of the 
definition and some of its elements.191 Here I focus on the 
definition’s technological assumption. The criterion applied by the                                      
                                                
190 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at 38, art. 2(a). The Proposed GDP 
Regulation separates the two definitions, defining “personal data” to mean “any 
information relating to a data subject,” (see Proposed GDP Regulation, supra 
note 6, at art. 4(2)) and “data subject” to mean “an identified natural person or a 
natural person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, by means reasonably 
likely to be used by the controller or by any other natural or legal person, in 
particular by reference to an identification number, location data, online 
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person” (see 
Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6, at art. 4(1)). The definition of data 
subject adds technological references of location data, online identifier and 
genetic identity. 
191 See WP 136, supra note 189. 
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Directive to identify personal data is the identification of the 
subject rather than the content of the data. Unlike the American 
sectoral approach, which points to specific kinds of data (plus 
governmental data and data about children under the age of 
thirteen), the Directive is at first blush agnostic regarding the 
content. The Directive does treat some data as more sensitive than 
others and requires additional legal attention to “special categories 
of data,” which are defined as “data revealing racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or 
sex life.”192 But this layer of content-based personal data is a 
second layer, on top of the identification-based layer. 
Perhaps the American sectoral approach might match 
common wisdom more directly: most of us would agree that 
certain kinds of data are more sensitive than others. Such a 
consensus might change over time and differ from place to place, 
reflecting local culture and perhaps history. The European 
approach, in its choice of identification as the basic criterion for its 
regulatory scheme, departs from such an imagined common 
wisdom. Importantly, the American approach does not end with 
the content-based criterion: most of the federal informational 
privacy laws apply the European standard of identification. Most 
contemporary laws that regulate personal data are triggered if the 
data collected and processed is personally identifiable information 
(PII).193 
However, viewed on the background of digital technology, 
the European approach reflects a digital mindset, whereas the 
content-based approach reflects an analogue one. The digital 
mindset acknowledges that seemingly innocent pieces of data can 
be combined to form a whole that is greater than the sum of its 
parts. While aggregating data and analyzing it is a technologically-
neutral activity, digital technologies enable the aggregation of 
mass quantities of data--their constant updating and, most 
importantly, mining the data, in a way that is different in kind, not 
only in quantity, than the equivalent analogue activities. To be 
subject to digital mining, the data need not be structured in any 
                                                
192 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at 40, art. 8(1). The Proposed GDP 
Regulation adds reference to the processing of genetic data and criminal 
convictions or related security measures. See Proposed GDP Regulation, supra 
note 6, at art. 9(1). 
193 See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a 
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 
(2011). 
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way, unlike analogue databases and their analysis.194 The facts of 
one’s name, date of birth, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual 
orientation, profession, social relationship, personal status, 
financial status, health status, as well as one’s online activities, 
intellectual interests or consumer habits—each on their own might 
not be considered private by some. More likely, some of us will be 
more passionate about the privacy of some of these data than of 
other details. But the combination of some of these details is what 
matters. Joining together one’s religion with one’s financial status 
creates an image, shallow as it might be; joining three facts from 
the above list, which is by far not an exhaustive one, makes the 
image more complex, until the accumulation of the data creates our 
profile. This is not the place to explicate the privacy-related 
concerns that arise when another person (or government or 
corporation) holds what it thinks is our profile,195 or in Daniel 
Solove’s term, our “digital dossier.”196 The point is that the profile 
is created by joining together bits of information, which are then 
further analyzed. This is a digital mindset to personal data, in that 
it is interested in all kinds of data, not only in data that is 
considered sensitive. 
The Directive’s approach is thus more advanced than 
previous approaches, in that it understands the power of joining 
separate bits together. In its language and references, it is a 
technology-neutral (and also context-neutral) definition, but it is 
informed by a digital concept and should be understood within a 
digital paradigm. For the time being, this is indeed the 
technological paradigm that we encounter in our daily lives. Note 
that this is not a historical argument; rather, it is a discursive one. 
Whether the drafters of the Directive foresaw the digital 
environment—or whether their reasoning for choosing the 
identification-based definition was to avoid the difficulty of 
reaching an agreement on which kinds of data are worthy of legal 
protection or not—are matters for legal historians to explore. The 
point is that the Directive easily fits a digital mindset. 
In a recent important work, Paul Ohm points to a major 
technological assumption of the Directive and many, if not all 
other 
 
                                                
194 The joint effect of these characteristics of data has earned the title “big data.” 
For a discussion of this effect, see Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for 
All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. (forthcoming 2013). 
195 On profiling, see PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008). 
196 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 2 (2004). 
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other informational privacy legislation.197 Ohm shows that the 
legislation assumes that anonymization is possible and thus, 
informational privacy laws often opt for anonymization as a “silver 
bullet solution.”198 Indeed, this is what lies at the heart of the 
Directive’s definition of personal data. However, based on 
contemporary research in the field of computer science, Ohm 
argued that anonymization is largely an obsolete notion: it is 
possible to de-anonymize data far more easily than lawyers have 
thus far assumed. Framed in the terms applied here, Ohm exposed 
a central hidden technological assumption of data protection law: 
the law’s assumption that there are technologies that can achieve 
irreversible anonymization. Once this tenet collapses, the data 
protection regime needs to reconfigure itself.199 The analysis 
offered here further deconstructs the façade of technology 
neutrality: the law seems to be technologically-neutral, but Ohm 
showed that it assumed a technology of a particular capability, 
which he then showed was a flawed assumption. 
Thus, for the time being, the definition of personal data is 
rooted within a digital technological paradigm, for good or for bad. 
The good part is that it is more advanced than the previous, 
analogue, content-based definition; the bad part is that the concept 
of non-identification is about to collapse, if it has not already done 
so. As long as we are within a digital technological paradigm, the 
definition will suffice, with adjustments needed to answer the 
challenge of de-anonymization. But, once new technologies 
appear, perhaps rooted in a different technological paradigm, the 
definition might reach its natural end. 
2. Processing of Personal Data 
After defining the key construct, the Directive turns to 
describe the actions taken in relation to personal data. Such actions 
all come under the heading of “processing personal data, “ which is 
defined as (the numbering was added to facilitate the discussion 
that follows):  
any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by 
automatic means, such as [1] collection, [2] 
recording, [3] organization, [4] storage, [5] 
                                                
197 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). 
198 Id. at 1736. 
199 For a suggestion, see Schwartz & Solove, supra note 1933. 
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adaptation or alteration, [6] retrieval, [7] 
consultation, [8] use, [9] disclosure by transmission, 
[10] dissemination or [11] otherwise making 
available, [12] alignment or combination, [13] 
blocking, [14] erasure or [15] destruction. 200 
 
This definition should be read along the Directive’s Article 
3, which defines its scope. On the inclusive side, the Directive 
applies to automatic and manual processing, if it is to be part of a 
database (Art. 3(1)).201 On the exclusive side, the Directive does 
not apply to national security and law enforcement activities (Art. 
3(2)); or to personal activity (Art. 3(2)), so that one’s personal 
email Address Book, for example, is not subject to the Directive.202 
Let us read the definition closely. It begins with a broad, 
inclusive statement: “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data” and is then accompanied by a list 
of activities. It is tempting to search and point to a category of 
processing that is not listed, but the Directive anticipated this, in its 
broad opening definition and in that the list is only illustrative 
(“such as”). Legally, the definition will cover new situations quite 
easily: either they would fall within a specific example or they are 
within the more general “use,” which seems to be the most open-
ended illustration. 
Such an expansive function-based definition is indeed 
technology-neutral. We can test this neutrality by considering 
several technologies that emerged after the Directive was adopted. 
For example, RFID tags can collect, record and store data; they 
enable the data’s retrieval, use, and disclosure.203 Geo-location 
techn 
                                                
200 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at 38, art. 2(b). Compare it to the 
taxonomy offered by Daniel Solove, which is divided into four clusters: 
collection, processing, dissemination and invasion. Each cluster is then sub-
divided into further kinds of activities. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING 
PRIVACY 103 (2008). The Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6, at art. 4(3), 
adds to this list “structuring” as the fourth situation in the list and deletes 
“blocking.” 
201 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at 39, art. 3(1) reads: “This Directive 
shall apply to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic 
means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal 
data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing 
system.” The Proposed GDP Regulation maintains the same definition, with 
minor stylistic changes. See supra note 6, at art. 2(1). 
202 The Proposed GDP Regulation maintains these exclusions. See id. art. 2(2). 
203 The Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party considered the matter and 
responded in the affirmative. Art. 29 DPWP, Working Document on Data 
Protection Issues Related to RFID Technology, WP 105 (Jan. 19, 2005), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp 
105_en.pdf. 
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technologies such as GPS enable the collection of one’s location, 
recording, organizing, and storing the data, so that it is adaptable, 
retrievable, used, disclosed, disseminated, made available to 
others, blocked, or erased.204 
But the reading offered here is interested not only in the 
legal scope, in which the Directive fares well, but in its underlying 
technological assumptions. Hence, we should read the list in a 
different way. The illustrative list is organized in a particular 
manner. It is quite apparent that the organizing theme is a 
chronological sequence. I classify the components into several 
clusters: input, management, internal usage, external usage (or 
output) and clean-up. 
Accordingly [see figure 1], steps 1-2 (collection, recording) 
describe input; steps 3-5 (organization, storage, adaptation) refer to 
the management of the database; steps 6-8 (retrieval, consultation, 
use) are internal usage; steps 9-12 (disclosure, dissemination, 
making available, alignment or combination) are output.205 Step 13 
(blocking) probably refers to external access to the data and if so, it 
is an aspect of output.206 The last two steps (erasure and 
destruction) are post-mortem clean-up: what happens with the data 
once it is no longer in use. 
                                                
204 Once again the Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party considered the matter 
and took it for granted that data collected about an identified person by geo-
location technologies is “processing.” See Art. 29 DPWP, Opinion 13/2011 on 
Geolocation Services on Smart Mobile Devices, WP 185 (May 16, 2011), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp 
185_en.pdf. 
205 Step 12, alignment or combination, can also be classified as usage (though in 
an external manner) by matching separate databases, once again reflecting the 
digital state of mind under which the combination of innocent data is greater 
than the sum of its parts. 
206 The Proposed GDP Regulation omits “blocking” from the list. Proposed 
GDP Regulation, supra note 6, at 41. 
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Figure 1: The Directive’s Linear vision of Data Processing 
 
 1. Collection 
 2. Recording 
 --------------- 
 3. Organization 
 4. Storage 
 5. Adaptation 
 ---------------- 
 6. Retrieval 
 7. Consultation 
 8. Use 
 --------------- 
 9. Disclosure 
 10. Dissemination 
 11. Making available 
 12. Alignment &  
 combination 
 13. Blocking 
 --------------- 
 14. Erasure 
 15. Destruction 
This reading indicates that the Directive reflects a 
progressive assumption about personal data. It assumes that data 
behaves similarly to human beings: it is born, grows up, becomes 
productive, and ultimately, it dies. Phrased in the human metaphor, 
the personal data’s “home” is the database. There is a further, 
deeper assumption here. It is that there are preparatory stages that 
serve as the basis of the real thing: the internal and external usage 
(output) that lie at the heart of “processing.” The first steps (input) 
are seen as an instrumental part, and the final steps (clean up) are 
seen as a wrapping up mechanism. The focus is on the central 
activities; those of processing. 
Thus read, the sequence of the illustrative list assumes a 
temporal linearity. It is a sensible and plausible approach. In fact, it 
is difficult to think of any other coherent way to organize the 
possible activities regarding personal data, unless we give up such 
an attempt altogether, or perhaps search instead for a functional 
definition (“all activities”), or one that is based on a delegation of 
power (“whatever the data subject consents to/disagrees with”). 
But, once again, the linear sequence assumes a particular 
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collected, then stored in a database, and only then is it used and 
might also be transferred to third parties.207 
The linearity further assumes that there are a few players 
involved; each appears in a different segment of the structure [see 
figure 2]. The Directive casts a few such players: data subject,208 
data controller,209 data processor,210 a third party,211 and a 
recipient.212 The players in the initial input steps are the data 
subject and the collector, which is considered by the Directive to 
be the controller; the chief player in the steps of management and 
internal usage is the data controller, perhaps with the assistance of 
the data processor; the players in the output steps are the data 
controller and the recipient of the data. The final steps (clean-up) 
are in the hands of the data controller. 
                                                
207 Lipton argues that many legislatures were concerned more with the collection 
of personal data, but that in recent years legislatures treat collection and 
dissemination on a continuum. Her example of the newer approach is the EU 
Directive. See Lipton, supra note 189, at 552. 
208 As noted earlier, the data subject is defined in the Directive’s definition of 
personal data as “an identified or identifiable natural person.” Council Directive 
95/46, supra note 1, at art. 2(a). 
209 A data controller is defined in the Directive as “the natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.” Council 
Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at art. 2(d). The Proposed GDP Regulation, supra 
note 6, at art. 4(5) adds “conditions” between the “purposes” and “means.” 
210 A data processor is defined in the Directive as “a natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on 
behalf of the controller.” Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at art. 2(e). The 
Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6, at art. 4(6) maintains this definition. 
211 A third party is defined in the Directive as “any natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or any other body other than the data subject, the 
controller, the processor and the persons who, under the direct authority of the 
controller or the processor, are authorized to process the data.” Council 
Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at art. 2(f). The Proposed GDP Regulation, supra 
note 6, omits this definition. 
212 A recipient is defined in the Directive as “a natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body to whom data are disclosed, whether a third 
party or not” and excludes authorized authorities. Council Directive 95/46, 
supra note 1, at art. 2(g). The Proposed GDP Regulation, supra note 6, art. 4(7) 
omits the reference to a third party and the exclusion of authorities. 
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Figure 2: The Players 
 
 1. Collection 
 2. Recording 
 --------------- 
 3. Organization 
 4. Storage 
 5. Adaptation 
 ---------------- 
 6. Retrieval 
 7. Consultation 
 8. Use 
 --------------- 
 9. Disclosure 
 10. Dissemination 
 11. Making available 
 12. Alignment &  
 combination 
 13. Blocking 
 --------------- 
 14. Erasure 
 15. Destruction 
The assumption about linearity, the segmentation, and the 
casting of different players to each segment create several meeting 
points between the segments and between the players in charge. 
The first meeting point, in the first segment (input), is between the 
source of the data (usually the data subject, but it can also be other 
sources)213 and the data controller (either the collector or the 
processor on the controller’s behalf). The second and third 
segments (management and internal use) are under the direction of 
the data controller, alone or with the assistance of a data processor. 
The fourth segment (output) sees the meeting point of the 
controller and a recipient. The final segment (clean-up) is once 
again under the direction of the controller (or the processor, on the 
controller’s behalf). 
The graphic depiction reveals one of the most acute 
challenges with which the Directive strives to deal: the data subject 
has a role only in the first stage. How, then, can the data subject 
extend his or her control over the later segments, where the subject 
is no longer part of the picture? Due to the subject’s disappearance 
                                                
213 Art. 11 addresses the situation where the data have not been obtained from 
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from later stages, the first meeting point becomes especially 
crucial. If the source of the data is the data subject herself, it is the 
time and place where the collector can convey information to the 
data subject and the data subject can exercise control: that is the 
point when she can consent (or decline). Accordingly, the data 
subject should be informed, either if the data is collected directly 
from her (Art. 10) or if it is collected from another source (Art. 
11); the purpose of the collection should be specified and explicit 
and the data can be used only in a way that is compatible with that 
purpose (Art. 6(1)(b)). Moreover, the data can be processed only 
upon the unambiguous consent of the data subject (Art. 7(a)), with 
some listed exceptions (Art. 7(b-f)). The Directive enables the data 
subject some power to assure her rights are not violated, by way of 
the rights of access and rectification (Art. 12). But the Directive 
acknowledges that these rights are insufficient and hence subjects 
the controllers to further duties. Above all, processing should be 
fair and lawful (Art. 6(1)(a)), and specifically, it should be for a 
legitimate purpose (Art. 6(1)(b)); the data collected should be 
adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which they are collected (Art. 6(1)(c)); the personal data collected 
should be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date (Art. 
6(1)(d)); and kept in a form which permits identification of data 
subjects for no longer than is necessary (Art. 6(1)(e)). Moreover, 
the data controller should maintain confidentiality and security 
(Art. 16, 17). The mechanisms are meant to extend the data 
subject’s control beyond the first stage [see figure 3]. 
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Figure 3: Data Subjects’ Rights 
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 --------------- 
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 5. Adaptation 
 ---------------- 
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 11. Making available 
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 combination 
 13. Blocking 
 --------------- 
 14. Erasure 
 15. Destruction 
The aggregate result is that the Directive provides a legal 
toolkit that creates rights for the data subject, effectively extending 
the subject’s control beyond the first stage.214 In practice, there are 
many difficulties with this structure: the rights are not always 
respected, the duties are not always fulfilled, and enforcement does 
not always succeed. The proposed principle of accountability 
might help in providing data subjects and regulators with more 
tools to address this challenge.215 These issues do require attention. 
However, for the purposes of the mission undertaken here, we can 
assume that the legal structure does work. The query is about the 
hidden technological assumptions. 
The linear data collection and processing mindset fits most 
technologies with which we are familiar today and the business 
models that utilize these technologies. We provide data to various 
service providers (schools, banks, doctors, communication 
providers, websites, vendors, etc.) who then process it in various  
   
                                                
214 The Proposed GDP Regulation seems to have identified the problem of the 
data subject’s limited control and suggests strengthening the power of data 
subjects in all current meeting points by requiring more transparency on behalf 
of the data controller and processor. Moreover, the proposal adds new meeting 
points, notably the right to be forgotten, which would enable users to demand 
the erasure of their data in certain circumstances. Proposed GDP Regulation, 
supra note 6. 
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internal and external ways. But future technologies might 
challenge this linear sequence. 
The various ways in which new technologies defy the current 
technological assumptions and the legal structure that the Directive 
built upon are yet to be explored. In the meantime, we can note a 
few clear technological trends that have already been identified, 
including by the EU itself: first, more data is collected in more 
settings and in less detectable ways.216 Second, a specific 
technology is the growing use of cloud computing.217 This means 
that more kinds of data, including personal data, are no longer 
stored on the user’s hard disk, but elsewhere. The implication is 
that as far as such cloud-stored data includes personal data, the 
data subject has even less control over the data.218 Third, data 
subjects can hardly control some kinds of data about themselves. 
Examples are genetic, biometric, and cognitive data, and data 
about our personality, behavior, and, perhaps one day, also our 
thoughts.219 In the absence of physical ability to control the data, 
the law can provide subjects with such control. One commercial 
application based on such tacit data is already gaining market 
power: Online Behavioral Advertisement (OBA), i.e., targeted ads 
based on one’s behavior.220 Fourth, new network applications, 
especially social networks, enable (or perhaps push) users to share 
personal data. The issue of privacy in social networks deserves 
much attention,221 but the intertwined technological and social 
assumptions of the Directive fail to address much of what is going 
on in such environments. All the Directive can do is address the 
relationship between the users and the platform, namely between 
                                                
216 2003 Review, supra note 172, § 1.2. Accordingly, the Proposed GDP 
Regulation emphasizes the importance of explicit consent. Proposed GDP 
Regulation, supra note 6, recital 33 and art. 8. 
217 WP 168, supra note 174, at 2. 
218 For cloud computing and its implications on data protection, see Robert 
Gellman, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality from 
Cloud Computing, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, (Feb. 23, 2009), 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_Cloud_Privacy_Report.pdf. 
219 For an analysis of the privacy implications of future technologies, see Final 
Horizon Scanning Report, PRACTIS – PRIVACY APPRAISING CHALLENGES TO 
TECHNOLOGIES AND ETHICS (July 2011), http://practis.org/docs/PRACTIS% 
20D2%202_130711final.pdf. 
220 For a recent discussion, see Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do 
Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online 
Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281 (2012). 
221 See, e.g., Lilian Edwards & Ian Brown, Data Control and Social Networks: 
Irreconcilable Ideas?, in HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW AND 
THE CORPORATION 202 (Andrea M. Matwyshyn ed., 2009); James 
Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009). 
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an end-user and the operator of the social network.222 However, the 
technology enables each user to reveal data not only about himself 
but also about his “friends,” including tagging photographs in 
which they appear and much more.223 The Directive is simply 
unequipped to deal with this new source of threat to our privacy.224  
Thus, more technologies collect data in a way that bypasses 
the initial meeting point between the subject and the controller, a 
point envisioned by the Directive and much relied upon. The 
Directive assumes the subject could exercise control if he or she 
were to know and be given an opportunity to make an informed 
decision. Reality has proven that bounded rationality, cognitive 
failures, limited attention, and low awareness, on occasion in 
unequal settings (such as employment), mean that the subject 
cannot exercise meaningful control.225 But without an initial 
meeting point in the first stage of the chain of data processing, the 
Directive’s vision of personal data and its processing crumbles and 
might fall apart. 
 
                                                
222 The Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party examined social networks and 
concluded that providers are data controllers and that most users act for purely 
personal or household activity, which is exempt from the Directive. The WP 
clarified the obligations of the operators and the rights of subjects, but could not 
do more regarding the users’ interaction with each other, other than requiring the 
provider to advise the users that information about others should not be 
uploaded without the other person’s consent. See Art. 29 DPWP, Opinion 
5/2009 on Online Social Networking, WP 163 (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/ justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf. 
223 The Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party realized the shortcoming of the 
Directive in this context. See WP 168, supra note 173, at 18 (noting that 
“[h]owever, Directive 95/46/EC does not apply to the individual who uploads 
the data for ‘purely personal’ purposes or ‘in the course of a household activity’. 
Arguably it does not apply either to the organization that provides the service, 
i.e. hosts and makes available the information uploaded by the individual (unless 
the service processes data for its own purposes) insofar as the service provider 
may not be deemed to be a controller. The result is a situation of lack of 
safeguards which may need to be addressed, particularly given the increase in 
the number of such situations. In this context, whoever offers services to a 
private individual should be required to provide certain safeguards regarding the 
security, and as appropriate the confidentiality of the information uploaded by 
users, regardless of whether their client is a data controller.”) (citations omitted). 
224 An empirical study conducted in Israel, which has an EU-adequate data 
protection legal regime, confirms this argument. See Michael D. Birnhack & 
Niva Elkin-Koren, Does Law Matter Online? Empirical Evidence on Privacy 
Law Compliance, 17 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. 337 (2011). 
225 For a discussion of these failures and some answers, see M. Ryan Calo, 
Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1027 (2012). The Proposed GDP Regulation suggests that in the case of 
“significant imbalance between the position of the data subject and the 
controller,” consent cannot provide a legal basis for processing. See Proposed 
GDP Regulation, supra note 6, at art. 7(4). 
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 3. Personal Data Filing System – aka 
Database 
The third key construct of the Directive is the filing system, 
which enters the stage after the definitions of personal data and 
processing of such data. The discussion of the Directive’s 
definition of “processing” indicated that it was geared towards the 
database. The definition of a “data filing system” confirms this 
tendency. The Directive reveals its line of thought: the destination 
of the personal data is to be included in a filing system, or, in the 
popular term, a database. The definition reads: “‘personal data 
filing system’ (‘filing system’) shall mean any structured set of 
personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria, 
whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or 
geographical basis . . . .”226 
Once again, the definition seems at first to be technology-
neutral. It does not even use the words computer or electronic and 
indeed, per the Directive, a database also includes manual lists.227 
The Directive further anticipated the option of decentralized 
systems, where the data is kept separately in two or more places, 
either in different jurisdictions or split along a criterion of their 
content. The broad scope is understandable—if a database would 
have a narrow definition, it would be easy for data controllers to 
structure their systems around the definition and thus avoid the 
duties imposed by the Directive. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the Directive does assume a 
particular technological mindset: it is focused on the idea of a 
database. This is indicated by the close reading suggested above 
and is further supported by official statements. The historical 
concerns that drove much of the early data protection legislation 
focused on the idea of a database: a place where personal data is 
accumulated.228 Recall the first principle of the Ware Report in the 
                                                
226 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at art. 2(c). The Proposed GDP 
Regulation, supra note 6, at art. 4(4) maintains this definition. 
227 Council Directive 95/46, supra note 1, at art. 3(1). The EU insists on 
covering manual databases. When it found the data protection laws of some 
countries to be adequate, even though these laws did not cover manual 
databases, the adequacy finding excluded the status from such databases. See, 
e.g., Art. 29 DPWP, Opinion 6/2009 on the Level of Protection of Personal Data 
in Israel, WP 165, at 5 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp165_en.pdf (finding that “it is not 
possible to consider the Israeli legislation as adequate with regard to non-
automated or manual processing systems.”). 
228 See William H. Ware, et al., Preface: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
EDUC. & WELFARE (July 1973), http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/ (quoting 
HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson’s findings: “there is a growing concern that 
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United States in 1973 – there should be no secret databases.229 In 
the absence of legal historical research, we can speculate that the 
reason for the focus on databases was the growing use of 
computers in the 1970s, especially by the government, and the 
negative memory of “black lists” that evolved into a database. By 
the time the European Directive was discussed in the early 1990s, 
computers were widely used by the private sector. Manual lists 
evolved into digital dossiers.230 
The focus on databases and the broad definition capture 
much of the data processing that takes place today, and that will 
take place in the near future. But we can already see its limits. One 
situation in which there is ample use (or processing, to stick to the 
Directive’s definitions) of personal data is in unstructured data, 
often referred to as Big Data. Technological mining capabilities 
render the pre-structuring of the data irrelevant. The data is 
collected but not arranged in any way. It is then mined in a way 
that produces meta-data: data about the data.231 
A second situation, which defies the Directive’s 
technological mindset, is the social setting, where users of systems 
publish, tag and process personal data of other users--put simply, 
social networks. The problem is that the risk to private data stems 
not only from the government or the market, but from our peers. 
Jonathan Zittrain called this Privacy 2.0, to denote its sphere in the 
Web 2.0 environment.232 The Directive assumes a technological 
environment of Web 1.0 and the related Privacy 1.0, where there is 
a powerful player (the data controller). Arguably, we can view a 
social network collectively as a database, i.e., as a filing system, 
though we might need to spend some effort in explaining how it is 
“structured” and how it is “accessible according to specific 
criteria.” Think of Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, or Twitter, for 
example. But even if we conclude that the social network is a filing 
system in the Directive’s meaning, the definition still does not 
address the essence of such a system: it is not de-centralized (a 
feature which is covered in the definition). It is a distributed 
system, in the sense that each node can act on its own, 
independently of the other nodes. The operator of the social 
network does have technical control but, at least in current social 
networks, it is not applied as to the content of the personal data one 
user reveals to another. On the contrary: the operators of the 
                                                                                                         
automated personal data systems present a serious potential for harmful 
consequences, including infringement of basic liberties.”). 
229 See Weinberger, supra note 111. 
230 See SOLOVE, supra note 200, at 2. 
231 See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 194. 
232 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 
205 (2008). 
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 system 
systems enable—and encourage—many features, which assist 
users to publish data about other users, tag their photos, and much 
more. 
A third example of the Directive’s database-based 
shortcoming is that there are emerging technologies which do not 
use a database at all, but nevertheless process our personal data. 
These systems act upon the data immediately, rather than store it in 
a database, such as biometric identification methods. There are 
many possible ways to structure the biometric identification 
system.233 One option is to collect the data from identified people 
(via fingerprints, facial features or iris scan) and store them in a 
database. Later on, when the police or the border control wish to 
identify a person, they can compare his or her features ““please 
place your index fingers here”) to those stored in the database. 
Another option is to collect the data but store it only in a chip, 
which is then included within the identification document, such as 
a passport. The police or any other authorized agency can compare 
the data stored in the chip to the real features of the person. The 
result is the possibility to authenticate the identity, i.e., to conclude 
whether the person is who she says she is. Such use processes 
personal data without a database (Note that this is data that the 
subject has less control over. It is difficult to change one’s finger 
prints or facial features.). Privacy is implicated in such systems 
even though there is no database. A legal regime which assumes a 
database is insufficient. 
* 
We have examined the building blocks of the Data 
Protection Directive: the definitions of personal data, processing, 
the players at stake, and the definition of a filing system. I 
conclude that the current legal structure uses technology-neutral 
language and manages to cover most technologies in current use. 
Nevertheless, the Directive assumes a digital environment of a 
certain kind, a linear processing of data destined to be included in a 
database. We already see a few technologies that challenge this 
structure, and we are likely to see more such technologies in the 
coming years. 
CONCLUSION 
Drafting legislation in a technologically-neutral manner is a 
much sought after goal. However, regulating technology and trying 
to be agnostic to the law’s subject matter at the same time seems to 
                                                
233 See Vassiliki Andronikou, Angelos Yannopoulos & Theodora 
Varvarigou, Biometric Profiling: Opportunities and Risks, in PROFILING THE 
EUROPEAN CITIZEN, supra note 195, at 131. 
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be an impossible mission. This article suggested an interpretive 
method of reverse engineering the law, meant to expose the law’s 
hidden assumptions about the regulated technology, i.e., the law’s 
technological mindset. To the extent that we manage to uncover 
the hidden assumptions of the law in such a manner, we pierce the 
façade of the law’s technology neutrality. Neutrality has its 
benefits, and I proposed that we evaluate it according to three 
justifications: flexibility, innovation and harmonization. We also 
saw that the legislative choice is richer than the binary 
neutral/specific option. But neutrality is not always attainable. 
In order to shed light on the hidden technological mindset 
and to illustrate the benefits of reverse engineering the law, the 
article examined the case of informational privacy law. This 
emerging legal field is at an important crossroad. The United 
States is reexamining its approach, and the European Union is 
deliberating substantive amendments to its Data Protection regime. 
One important aspect in shaping the law and updating it is the 
law’s stance regarding technology. 
Applying the interpretive mode of reverse engineering the 
law to the EU Directive, the main finding was that although the 
Directive purports to be technology-neutral and to a great extent it 
is so, it does have some hidden technological assumptions. The 
data protection regime, as well as the proposed amendments, is 
within a digital technological paradigm rather than an analogue 
one. This is progress, of course, but we can begin noting the limits 
of the digital paradigm. 
As long as we are within the digital paradigm, the Directive 
will manage to cope with new technologies that are within this 
technological paradigm. However, once the current technological 
paradigm will be replaced with a newer one (as it is bound to be), 
and once we will experience a transformative technology,234 the 
entire data protection regime will require rethinking, not just 
occasional amendments. At that point, we will realize that the law 
was not technology-neutral. We should keep in mind the 
technological paradigm within which the Directive and much of 
data protection law elsewhere operate. Once we face new 
technologies that break the boundaries of the digital paradigm, the 
Directive is unlikely to be sustained in its current form. 
                                                
234 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 57, at 43. The standard definition of 
transformative technologies refers to them as general-purpose technologies, 
which are “characterized by the potential for persuasive use in a wide range of 
sectors and by their technological dynamism.”). Id. See also Timothy F. 
Bresnahan & Manuel Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies “Engines of 
Growth?”, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83, 84 (1995). 
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 In the meantime, the level of abstraction, function-based 
definitions, structure of informational privacy law and especially 
its leading engine, the European Directive, enables the law to 
remain valid. Concretization of the various principles is needed, 
and such detailing often requires responses to particular 
technologies. The Article 29 Working Party provides general 
professional guidance on new technologies: take, for example, its 
view on social networks or geo-location technologies. Specific 
decisions are made by data protection authorities and on occasion 
by courts ex post. This structure enables the law to remain general 
and principled, and to proceed with specific, case-based 
application. 
The discussion also suggests a few future research 
directions: looking to the past, legal history of data protection law 
is likely to yield interesting patterns. Looking to the future, the 
proposed amendments in the United States and in the EU require 
attention. Especially intriguing is the principle of Privacy by 
Design. It has become popular and is now formally on the 
discussion table – but it requires much unpacking. Finally, new 
technologies should be studied. We should explore their embedded 
values so as to figure out their privacy tendencies and see if these 
fit the law’s technological mindset. Once the match no longer 
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